BILL NUMBER:S6679

TITLE OF BILL:
An act
to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to suspending jury
deliberations

This is one in a series of measures being introduced at the request of
the Chief Administrative Judge upon the recommendation of her
Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure.

This measure would amend the Criminal Procedure Law to allow a trial
court to suspend jury deliberations for up to forty-eight hours
(excluding weekends and holidays) in appropriate cases.

In 1995, the Legislature gave trial courts discretion to forego
sequestration in most cases (L. 1995, c. 83). Over the next several
years, the Legislature required the Chief Administrative Judge and
the Office of Court Administration to conduct an annual study of the
change and file a report with the Governor, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly. The reports found that there
were significant cost-savings to the change and that eliminating
sequestration did not result in an increase in jury tampering or an
increase the number of mistrials. After five years, the Legislature
made permanent the changes and expanded the reach of the statute to
permit trial courts to forego sequestration in all cases (L. 2001, c.
              

47).

A trial court's discretion is not unfettered, however, and the current
statute provides that a court may only suspend jury deliberations
"for a reasonable period of time ... not to exceed twenty-four
hours" (CPL 310.10(2). Undoubtedly, the twenty-four hour limit is
intended to permit deliberating jurors to go home each night and
return on the next day when the court is in session. Unfortunately,
circumstances often arise that make it impossible to reconvene the
jury within twenty-four hours, as was illustrated in a
recent case arising in Kings County (see People v Taylor, 32 Mise 3d
546 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2011, Del Giudice, J.)). In Taylor, a
deliberating juror was briefly hospitalized and unable to return to
Court to resume further deliberations the following day. The defense
immediately moved for a mistrial, claiming that the express language
of CPL 310.10(2) prevented the court from adjourning deliberations
more than 24 hours, even though the juror would be available one day
later. There were no indications of juror tampering nor did it appear
that jury deliberations would be impeded by the additional delay
caused by the juror's hospitalization. The case highlights the
inflexibility of the statute, and the court urged legislative action
to amend the statute.

We believe that the arbitrary limit of twenty-four hours should be
relaxed in appropriate cases. While our Advisory Committee considered

recommending elimination of the twenty-four hour restriction
altogether and allowing courts discretion to suspend deliberations
"for a reasonable period of time," it ultimately favored an approach
that provides courts with more, but not unfettered, discretion. Thus,
this measure retains the twenty-four hour limit in most cases, but
provides, "upon good cause shown, an additional period not to exceed
72 hours." By requiring "good cause" for any suspension longer than
twenty-four hours, the measure insures that lengthy suspensions of
jury deliberations will not become routine.

This measure, which would have no meaningful fiscal impact on the
State, would take effect immediately, and shall apply to all criminal
actions pending on or after such effective date.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
New proposal.