senate Bill S6815

Relates to the reentry of former foster care children into foster care; repealer

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Bill Status


  • Introduced
  • In Committee
  • On Floor Calendar
    • Passed Senate
    • Passed Assembly
  • Delivered to Governor
  • Signed/Vetoed by Governor
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actions

  • 12 / Mar / 2014
    • REFERRED TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
  • 28 / May / 2014
    • 1ST REPORT CAL.1003
  • 29 / May / 2014
    • 2ND REPORT CAL.
  • 02 / Jun / 2014
    • ADVANCED TO THIRD READING
  • 18 / Jun / 2014
    • PASSED SENATE
  • 18 / Jun / 2014
    • DELIVERED TO ASSEMBLY
  • 18 / Jun / 2014
    • REFERRED TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

Summary

Relates to the reentry of former foster care children into foster care.

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Bill Details

Versions:
S6815
Legislative Cycle:
2013-2014
Current Committee:
Assembly Children And Families
Law Section:
Family Court Act
Laws Affected:
Amd §§355.3, 756-a, 1088, 1091, 1055 & 1089, rpld §1055 sub (b) ¶(i) sub¶ (E), §1089 sub (d) ¶2 sub¶ (viii) cl (C), Fam Ct Act

Sponsor Memo

BILL NUMBER:S6815

TITLE OF BILL: An act to amend the family court act, in relation to
reentry of former foster children into foster care; and to repeal
certain provisions of such law relating to making technical
corrections thereto

This is one in a series of measures being introduced at the request of
the Chief Administrative Judge upon the recommendation of her Family
Court Advisory and Rules Committee.

Chapter 342 of the Laws of 2010, which permits youth, who have "aged
out" of foster care at age 18, to reenter care, has provided a vital
"safety net" in cases where the youth would otherwise be facing
homelessness or other adverse outcomes. Enacted when Federal foster
care assistance first became available for youth between the ages of
18 and 21,* the statute has proven invaluable in preventing future
societal costs by ensuring that affected youth will have the support
necessary to fulfill commitments they must make to participate in
educational or vocational programs as a condition of reentry into
care.

This measure would clarify one aspect of the statute that has caused
some confusion, i.e., the categories of former foster youth to which
the statute applies. "Former foster care youth" is not defined in
Family Court Act Article 10-B and, although referenced in the
permanency hearing provisions (Family Court Act Article 10-A), no
specific cross-references are contained in provisions applicable to
juvenile delinquents or Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS). This
measure would remedy that gap by amending the post-dispositional
provisions regarding extensions of placement in the juvenile
delinquency and PINS statutes (Family Court Act §§ 355.3, 756-a(f)) to
include references to Family Court Act § 1091. It would further amend
section 1091 of the Family Court Act to add a definition of "former
foster care youth" explicitly including youth placed in foster care
with local social services districts pursuant to juvenile delinquency,
PINS, child protective or destitute child adjudications and voluntary
placements, as well as children freed for adoption but not yet
adopted, whose guardianship and custody have been transferred to a
local social services district or authorized child care agency. It
would not include juvenile delinquents discharged from placement with
the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS).

This measure would codify the only appellate ruling on the statute to
date and is consistent with the position taken by OCFS, the oversight
agency for foster care in New York. The Appellate Division, Second
Department, in Matter of Jefry H., 102 A.D,3d 132 (2nd Dept., 2012),
reversed a Family Court decision in which the judge had construed the
absence of specific language to mean that the statute did not cover
PINS cases. In holding that section 1091 of the Family Court Act does
apply to PINS who had been placed in foster care, the Appellate
Division noted that the rationale for enacting chapter 342 applies
with equal force to all foster youth discharged from care. The Court
further noted the broad interpretation accorded to the scope of the
statute by the OCFS. Id. Consistent with Federal requirements to treat
all categories of youth eligible to receive foster care assistance
under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act identically, the OCFS, in


its administrative memorandum to local social services districts,
indicated that the statute applied to all former foster youth,
including former foster care youth placed with local departments of
social services. See 11-OCFS ADM-02 (March 3, 2011) at pps 2, 7.

Professor Merril Sobie, in his 2012 Practice Commentary to section
1091, indicated that "(t)he language strongly suggests that the
statute applies to each and every foster child, and is not limited to
children who have been placed as a result of an Article 10 (child
protective) proceeding." Writing before the Appellate Division
reversal in Matter ofjefty H., Prof. Sable continued: It would have
been preferable if Article 10-8 had been drafted to explicitly apply
to non-Article 10 placements. (See, by comparison, Section 1087(a),
which enumerates the placements for which Article 10-A applies.) But
the lack of an explicit provision is not necessarily dispositive. It's
difficult to conceive that the Legislature intended to differentiate
or discriminate between similarly situated "former foster care youth",
or that the legislative decision to craft a separate article excludes
non-Article 10 children (if Section 1091 was intended to be limited to
Article 10 placements, it would have presumably been added to that
Article). The issue will probably be raised and determined at the
Appellate Division level (unless the Legislature quickly amends
Section 1091).

Predictably, most youth returning to foster care are those who had
been placed pursuant to child protective proceedings, but the option
is equally vital for those youth in the juvenile justice system who
have been placed with local social services districts. As the
Supporting Memorandum for chapter 342 stated:

Although the Family Court Act permits (foster youth) to consent to
continued foster care with its attendant supports and services until
they reach the age of 21, many make precipitous decisions to show
their independence and refuse to consent to remain in care even when
they are desperately in need of assistance. Youth living in intact
families are not faced with such decisions; they may leave home to
attend college, but they do not abruptly terminate all connections
with their families and often continue to receive financial and other
aid. Youth leaving foster care, in contrast, often have no family to
fall back on. For them, independent living may be akin to falling off
a precipice.

(Assembly Mem in Support, Bill jacket, L. 2010, c. 342 at 8). The
well-documented problems faced by these youth - increased incidence of
school drop-out, homelessness, unemployment, criminality and teen
pregnancy - are even more likely to afflict the vulnerable juvenile
justice population upon discharge from care. In its memos to the
Governor regarding chapter 342, both the Division of the Budget and
OCFS noted the additional costs to counties from these adverse
consequences that would be averted by permitting the option for youth
to reenter foster care. See Memo of Division of the Budget and Letter
from OCFS General Counsel, Bill Jacket, L. 2010 c. 342. Codification
of Matter of Jefry H. through enactment of this measure, therefore,
will provide a cost-effective avenue to support a particularly
vulnerable population as they make the difficult transition to
independent adulthood.


This measure, which would have no fiscal impact upon the State, would
take effect immediately.

2013 Legislative History: VETO #226 (Senate 4529-B (Senator
Felder)/Assembly 7339 (M. of A. Lupardo))

*Security Act became available as of October 1, 2010 pursuant to the
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008
(Public Law 110351).

view bill text
                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                  6815

                            I N  S E N A T E

                             March 12, 2014
                               ___________

Introduced by Sen. FELDER -- (at request of the Office of Court Adminis-
  tration)  --  read  twice  and ordered printed, and when printed to be
  committed to the Committee on Children and Families

AN ACT to amend the family court act, in relation to reentry  of  former
  foster  children into foster care; and to repeal certain provisions of
  such law relating to making technical corrections thereto

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section  1. Subdivision 6 of section 355.3 of the family court act, as
amended by chapter 663 of the laws  of  1985,  is  amended  to  read  as
follows:
  6. Successive extensions of placement under this section may be grant-
ed,  but  no  placement may be made or continued beyond the respondent's
eighteenth birthday without [the child's] HIS OR HER consent and  in  no
event  past  [the child's] HIS OR HER twenty-first birthday.  A RESPOND-
ENT, WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY PLACED OR  TRANSFERRED  INTO  PLACEMENT  WITH  A
LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION OR SECTION 353.3
OR  355.1  OF THIS ARTICLE AND WHO WAS DISCHARGED FROM FOSTER CARE ON OR
AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE CHILD ATTAINED THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN DUE TO  A
FAILURE  TO  CONSENT TO THE CONTINUATION OF PLACEMENT, MAY MOVE OR, WITH
HIS OR HER CONSENT, MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A MOTION BY A SOCIAL  SERVICES
OFFICIAL  TO  REENTER  FOSTER  CARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION ONE THOUSAND NINETY-ONE OF THIS ACT.
  S 2. Subdivision (f) of section 756-a of  the  family  court  act,  as
added by chapter 604 of the laws of 1986, is amended to read as follows:
  (f)  Successive  extensions  of  placement  under  this section may be
granted, but no placement may be made or continued  beyond  the  child's
eighteenth  birthday without his or her consent and in no event past his
or her twenty-first birthday.  A CHILD WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY PLACED WITH  A
LOCAL  SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT PURSUANT TO SECTION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-
SIX OF THIS PART AND WHO WAS DISCHARGED FROM FOSTER CARE ON OR AFTER THE
DATE ON WHICH HE OR SHE ATTAINED THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN DUE TO A FAILURE TO
CONSENT TO CONTINUATION OF PLACEMENT  MAY  MOVE  OR,  WITH  HIS  OR  HER
CONSENT, MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A MOTION BY A SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICIAL TO

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD13786-01-4

S. 6815                             2

REENTER  FOSTER  CARE  IN  ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION ONE
THOUSAND NINETY-ONE OF THIS ACT.
  S  3.  Section 1088 of the family court act, as amended by chapter 605
of the laws of 2011, is amended to read as follows:
  S 1088. Continuing court jurisdiction. (A) If a child is placed pursu-
ant to section three hundred fifty-eight-a, three  hundred  eighty-four,
or  three  hundred eighty-four-a of the social services law, or pursuant
to section one thousand seventeen, one thousand twenty-two, one thousand
twenty-seven, one thousand  fifty-two,  one  thousand  eighty-nine,  one
thousand  ninety-one,  one  thousand ninety-four or one thousand ninety-
five of this act, or directly placed with a relative pursuant to section
one thousand seventeen or one thousand fifty-five of this act; or if the
child is freed for adoption pursuant to section SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
OF THIS ACT OR  SECTION  three  hundred  eighty-three-c,  three  hundred
eighty-four  or  three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law,
the case shall remain on the court's calendar and the court shall  main-
tain  jurisdiction  over  the  case  until  the child is discharged from
placement and all orders regarding supervision, protection  or  services
have expired.
  (B)  The  court shall rehear the matter whenever it deems necessary or
desirable, or upon motion by any party entitled to notice in proceedings
under this article, or by the attorney for the  child,  and  whenever  a
permanency  hearing  is  required by this article. While the court main-
tains jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of section one thousand
thirty-eight of this act shall continue to apply.
  (C) The court  shall  also  maintain  jurisdiction  over  a  case  for
purposes of hearing a motion to permit a former foster care youth [under
the age of twenty-one who was discharged from foster care due to a fail-
ure  to consent to continuation of placement], AS DEFINED IN SUBDIVISION
(A) OF SECTION ONE THOUSAND NINETY-ONE OF THIS ACT,  to  return  to  the
custody  of  the [local commissioner of] social services [or other offi-
cer, board or department authorized to receive children as public charg-
es] DISTRICT FROM WHICH THE YOUTH WAS MOST RECENTLY DISCHARGED,  OR,  IN
THE CASE OF A CHILD FREED FOR ADOPTION, THE AUTHORIZED AGENCY INTO WHOSE
CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP THE CHILD HAS BEEN PLACED.
  S  4. Section 1091 of the family court act, as added by chapter 342 of
the laws of 2010, is amended to read as follows:
  S 1091. Motion to return to foster care placement. (A) FOR PURPOSES OF
THIS ARTICLE, "FORMER FOSTER CARE YOUTH" SHALL MEAN A  YOUTH  UNDER  THE
AGE  OF  TWENTY-ONE  WHO  WAS  DISCHARGED  FROM  FOSTER CARE ON OR AFTER
ATTAINING THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN DUE TO A FAILURE TO CONSENT  TO  CONTINUA-
TION  IN  FOSTER CARE AND WHO HAD BEEN: (1) PLACED IN FOSTER CARE WITH A
LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE  THREE,  SEVEN,  TEN,
TEN-A OR TEN-C OF THIS ACT OR SECTION THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT-A OF THE
SOCIAL  SERVICES  LAW;  OR  (2)  FREED  FOR  ADOPTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN OF THIS ACT OR  SECTION  THREE  HUNDRED
EIGHTY-THREE-C, THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR OR THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR-B
OF  THE  SOCIAL  SERVICES  LAW  BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN ADOPTED; OR (3) THE
SUBJECT OF A MOTION TO RESTORE PARENTAL  RIGHTS  THAT  HAS  BEEN  CONDI-
TIONALLY  GRANTED  PURSUANT  TO  PARAGRAPH  (III)  OF SUBDIVISION (B) OF
SECTION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN OF THIS ACT.
  (B) A motion to return a former foster care youth [under  the  age  of
twenty-one,  who  was  discharged  from  foster care due to a failure to
consent to continuation of placement,] to  the  custody  of  the  [local
commissioner  of] social services [or other officer, board or department
authorized to receive children as public charges]  DISTRICT  FROM  WHICH

S. 6815                             3

THE YOUTH WAS MOST RECENTLY DISCHARGED, OR, IN THE CASE OF A CHILD FREED
FOR  ADOPTION,  THE  SOCIAL  SERVICES DISTRICT OR AUTHORIZED AGENCY INTO
WHOSE CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP THE CHILD HAS BEEN PLACED, may be made by
such  former  foster  care  youth,  or by a local social services OR, IF
APPLICABLE, AN AUTHORIZED AGENCY  official  upon  the  consent  of  such
former  foster  care  youth,  if  there  is a compelling reason for such
former foster care youth to return to foster  care[;  provided  however,
that the].
  (C)  THE  court  shall  not entertain a motion filed after twenty-four
months from the date of the first final discharge that  occurred  on  or
after the former foster care youth's eighteenth birthday.
  [(a)]  (D)  A motion made pursuant to this [section] ARTICLE by [a] AN
APPROPRIATE LOCAL social services official OR, IN THE CASE  OF  A  CHILD
FREED  FOR  ADOPTION,  AN  APPROPRIATE LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICIAL OR
OFFICIAL OF THE AUTHORIZED AGENCY INTO WHOSE  CUSTODY  AND  GUARDIANSHIP
THE  CHILD  HAS  BEEN PLACED, shall be made by order to show cause. Such
motion shall show by affidavit or other evidence that:
  (1) the former foster care youth  has  no  reasonable  alternative  to
foster care;
  (2) the former foster care youth consents to enrollment in and attend-
ance  at  an  appropriate  educational  or  vocational  program,  unless
evidence is submitted that such enrollment or attendance is  unnecessary
or inappropriate, given the particular circumstances of the youth;
  (3)  re-entry  into foster care is in the best interests of the former
foster care youth; and
  (4) the former foster care youth consents to the re-entry into  foster
care.
  [(b)](E)  A motion made pursuant to this [section] ARTICLE by a former
foster care youth shall be made by order to show cause [or] ON ten  days
notice  to the social services official OR, IN THE CASE OF A CHILD FREED
FOR ADOPTION, THE SOCIAL SERVICES OFFICIAL OR OFFICIAL OF THE AUTHORIZED
AGENCY INTO WHOSE CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP THE CHILD  HAS  BEEN  PLACED.
Such motion shall show by affidavit or other evidence that:
  (1)  the  requirements  outlined  in  paragraphs one, two and three of
subdivision [(a)] (D) of this section are met; and
  (2) (I) the [applicable] APPROPRIATE local social services  [district]
OFFICIAL  OR,  IF APPLICABLE, OFFICIAL OF THE AUTHORIZED AGENCY consents
to the re-entry of such former foster care youth, or [if]
  (II) the [applicable] APPROPRIATE  local  social  services  [district]
OFFICIAL OR, IF APPLICABLE, OFFICIAL OF THE AUTHORIZED AGENCY refuses to
consent to the re-entry of such former foster care youth and [that] such
refusal is unreasonable.
  [(c)](F)  (1)  If  at  any  time  during  the pendency of a proceeding
brought pursuant to this [section] ARTICLE, the court finds a compelling
reason that it is in the best interests of the former foster care  youth
to  be  returned  immediately  to  the  custody of the APPROPRIATE local
commissioner of social services or [other officer, board  or  department
authorized  to  receive  children  as  public charges], IN THE CASE OF A
CHILD FREED FOR ADOPTION, THE APPROPRIATE LOCAL COMMISSIONER  OF  SOCIAL
SERVICES  OR  AUTHORIZED  AGENCY INTO WHOSE CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP THE
CHILD HAS BEEN PLACED, pending a final decision on the motion, the court
may issue a temporary order returning the youth to the custody of  [the]
SUCH  local  commissioner of social services or [other officer, board or
department authorized to receive children as public charges], IF  APPLI-
CABLE, SUCH AUTHORIZED AGENCY.

S. 6815                             4

  (2) Where the APPROPRIATE local social services district OR, IF APPLI-
CABLE,  THE AUTHORIZED AGENCY, has refused to consent to the re-entry of
a former foster care youth, and where it is alleged pursuant to SUBPARA-
GRAPH (II) OF paragraph two of subdivision [(b)] (E)  of  this  section,
that  such  refusal  [by such social services district] is unreasonable,
the court shall grant a motion made pursuant to subdivision [(b)](E)  of
this  section  if the court finds and states in writing that the refusal
[by the local social services district] is unreasonable.   For  purposes
of this [section] ARTICLE, a court shall find that a refusal [by a local
social  services district] to allow a former foster care youth to re-en-
ter care is unreasonable if:
  (i) the youth has no reasonable alternative to foster care;
  (ii) the youth consents to enrollment in and attendance at  an  appro-
priate  educational  or  vocational  program,  unless  the court finds a
compelling reason that such enrollment or attendance is  unnecessary  or
inappropriate, given the particular circumstances of the youth; and
  (iii) re-entry into foster care is in the best interests of the former
foster CARE youth.
  (3)  Upon  making  a  determination on a motion filed pursuant to this
[section] ARTICLE, where a motion has previously been  granted  pursuant
to  this  [section]  ARTICLE,  in  addition  to  the applicable findings
required by this [section] ARTICLE, the court shall grant the motion  to
return  a  former  foster  care  youth to the custody of the APPROPRIATE
local commissioner of  social  services  or  [other  officer,  board  or
department authorized to receive children as public charges] IF APPLICA-
BLE, THE AUTHORIZED AGENCY only:
  (i)  upon  a finding that there is a compelling reason for such former
foster care youth to return to care;
  (ii) if the court has not previously granted a subsequent  motion  for
such  former  foster care youth to return to care pursuant to this para-
graph; and
  (iii) upon consideration of the former foster care youth's  compliance
with  previous  orders  of  the  court,  including  the youth's previous
participation in an appropriate educational or  vocational  program,  if
applicable.
  S  5.  Subparagraph (E) of paragraph (i) of subdivision (b) of section
1055 of the family court act, as amended by chapter 342 of the  laws  of
2010, is amended to read as follows:
  (E) where the permanency goal is return to the parent and it is antic-
ipated  that  the  child  may be finally discharged to his or her parent
before the next scheduled permanency hearing, the court may provide  the
local  social  services district with authority to finally discharge the
child to the parent without further court  hearing,  provided  that  ten
days  prior written notice is served upon the court and the attorney for
the child. If the court on its own motion or the attorney for the  child
on  motion  to  the  court does not request the matter to be brought for
review before final discharge, no further permanency  hearings  will  be
required.  The  local  social  services  district may also discharge the
child on a trial basis to the parent unless  the  court  has  prohibited
such  trial  discharge  or  unless  the court has conditioned such trial
discharge on another event. For the  purposes  of  this  section,  trial
discharge shall mean that the child is physically returned to the parent
while  the  child  remains  in  the care and custody of the local social
services district. Permanency hearings shall continue to be held for any
child who has returned to his or her parents on a trial discharge. Where
the permanency goal for a youth aging out  of  foster  care  is  another

S. 6815                             5

planned   permanent  living  arrangement  that  includes  a  significant
connection to an adult willing to  be  a  permanency  resource  for  the
youth,  the  local social services district may also discharge the youth
on  a  trial  basis to the planned permanent living arrangements, unless
the  court  has  prohibited  or  otherwise  conditioned  such  a   trial
discharge.  Trial  discharge  for a youth aging out of foster care shall
mean that a youth is physically discharged but the local social services
district retains care and custody or custody  and  guardianship  of  the
youth  and  there  remains  a  date certain for the scheduled permanency
hearing. Trial discharge for a youth aging out of  foster  care  may  be
extended  at  each scheduled permanency hearing, until the child reaches
the age of twenty-one, if a child over the age of eighteen  consents  to
such extension. Prior to finally discharging a youth aging out of foster
care  to  another planned permanent living arrangement, the local social
services official shall give the youth notice of the right to  apply  to
reenter  foster  care  within  the  earlier of twenty-four months of the
final discharge or the youth's twenty-first birthday in accordance  with
article  ten-B of this act. Such notice shall also advise the youth that
reentry into foster care will only be available where the former  foster
care  youth has no reasonable alternative to foster care and consents to
enrollment in and attendance at an appropriate educational or vocational
program in accordance with paragraph two of  subdivision  [(a)]  (D)  of
section  one thousand ninety-one of this act. Children placed under this
section shall be placed until the court completes the initial permanency
hearing scheduled pursuant to article ten-A  of  this  act.  Should  the
court  determine  pursuant  to  article ten-A of this act that placement
shall be extended beyond completion of the scheduled permanency hearing,
such extended placement and any such successive extensions of  placement
shall expire at the completion of the next scheduled permanency hearing,
unless the court shall determine, pursuant to article ten-A of this act,
to continue to extend such placement.
  S  6.  Subdivision  (e)  of  section  1055 of the family court act, as
amended by chapter 342 of the laws  of  2010,  is  amended  to  read  as
follows:
  (e)  No  placement  may be made or continued under this section beyond
the child's eighteenth birthday without his or her  consent  and  in  no
event  past  his  or her twenty-first birthday. However, a former foster
care youth under the age of twenty-one  who  was  previously  discharged
from  foster  care due to a failure to consent to continuation of place-
ment may make a motion pursuant to section one  thousand  ninety-one  of
this  act  to  return to the custody of the local commissioner of social
services or other officer, board or  department  authorized  to  receive
children  as  public  charges. In such motion, the youth must consent to
enrollment in and attendance at a vocational or educational  program  in
accordance  with  paragraph  two of subdivision [(a)] (D) of section one
thousand ninety-one of this act.
  S 7. Clause (C) of subparagraph (viii) of paragraph 2  of  subdivision
(d)  of  section 1089 of the family court act, as amended by chapter 342
of the laws of 2010, is amended to read as follows:
  (C) Where the permanency goal is return to parent  and  it  is  antic-
ipated  that  the  child  may be returned home before the next scheduled
permanency hearing, the court may  provide  the  local  social  services
district  with  authority  to  finally discharge the child to the parent
without further court hearing, provided  that  ten  days  prior  written
notice is served upon the court and attorney for the child. If the court
on  its  own motion or the attorney for the child on motion to the court

S. 6815                             6

does not request the matter  to  be  brought  for  review  before  final
discharge,  no  further  permanency hearings will be required. The local
social services district may also discharge the child on a  trial  basis
to  the  parent  unless the court has prohibited such trial discharge or
unless the court has conditioned such trial discharge on another  event.
For  the  purposes  of this section, trial discharge shall mean that the
child is physically returned to the parent while the  child  remains  in
the  care and custody of the local social services district.  Permanency
hearings shall continue to be held for any child who has returned to his
or her parents on a trial discharge. Where the  permanency  goal  for  a
youth  aging  out  of  foster  care  is another planned permanent living
arrangement that includes a significant connection to an  adult  willing
to  be  a  permanency  resource for the youth, the local social services
district may also discharge the youth on a trial basis  to  the  planned
permanent living arrangements, unless the court has prohibited or other-
wise  conditioned  such  a  trial discharge. Trial discharge for a youth
aging out of foster  care  shall  mean  that  the  youth  is  physically
discharged  but  the  local  social  services  district retains care and
custody or custody and guardianship of the child  and  there  remains  a
date certain for the scheduled permanency hearing. Trial discharge for a
youth aging out of foster care may be extended at each scheduled perman-
ency  hearing, until the youth reaches the age of twenty-one, if a youth
over the age of eighteen consents to such extension.  Prior  to  finally
discharging  a  youth aging out of foster care to another planned perma-
nent living arrangement, the local social services official  shall  give
the youth notice of the right to apply to reenter foster care within the
earlier  of  twenty-four  months  of  the final discharge or the youth's
twenty-first birthday in accordance with article ten-B of this act. Such
notice shall also advise the youth that reentry into  foster  care  will
only  be  available where the former foster care youth has no reasonable
alternative to foster care and consents to enrollment in and  attendance
at  an  appropriate educational or vocational program in accordance with
paragraph two of subdivision [(a)] (D) of section one  thousand  ninety-
one of this act.
  S  8.  Subparagraph (E) of paragraph (i) of subdivision (b) of section
1055 of the family court act, as amended by chapter 41 of  the  laws  of
2010, is REPEALED.
  S  9.  Clause (C) of subparagraph (viii) of paragraph 2 of subdivision
(d) of section 1089 of the family court act, as amended by chapter 41 of
the laws of 2010, is REPEALED.
  S 10. This act shall take effect immediately.
  REPEAL NOTE: The amendments made to subparagraph (E) of paragraph  (i)
of  subdivision  (b)  of  section 1055 and to clause (C) of subparagraph
(viii) of paragraph 2 of subdivision (d) of section 1089 of  the  family
court act by sections 67 and 80, respectively, by chapter 41 of the laws
of  2010  substitute  "child's  attorney"  for "law guardian" but do not
contain the amendments contained in chapter 342 of  the  laws  of  2010.
Chapter 342 of the laws of 2010 uses the equivalent phrase "attorney for
the child."

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