NY State Senate Bill S7006B

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

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Actions

view actions (5)

	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
Feb 12, 2018	print number 7006b
Feb 12, 2018	amend and recommit to codes
Jan 05, 2018	print number 7006a
Jan 05, 2018	amend and recommit to codes
Jan 03, 2018	referred to codes

Bill Amendments

Original

B (Active)

Original

B (Active)

Co-Sponsors

S7006 - Details

Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S1738

S7006 - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

S7006 - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S7006

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:  An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in
relation to time limits for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,
after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June
6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than
70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guide-
lines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the
People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.
Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the
prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As
a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood
before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and
got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-
month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2016: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly
2015: S5988/A8296 - REFERRED TO RULES/ referred to codes

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

S7006 - Bill Text download pdf


                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                  7006

                            I N  S E N A T E

                               (PREFILED)

                             January 3, 2018
                               ___________

Introduced  by  Sens.  BAILEY,  ADDABBO,  ALCANTARA,  BRESLIN, CARLUCCI,
  COMRIE -- read twice and ordered  printed,  and  when  printed  to  be
  committed to the Committee on Codes

AN  ACT  to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
  for a speedy trial

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
  §  2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by chapter
184 of the laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3  as  amended  by
chapter  93  of  the  laws  of  2006,  paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 as
amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
vision 4 as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph  (i)  of
subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
of  subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994, paragraph
(b) of subdivision 5 as amended by chapter 109  of  the  laws  of  1982,
paragraphs  (e)  and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209 of the
laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
§ 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
  1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three]  FOUR  OF  THIS
SECTION,  a  motion made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of
section 170.30 or paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20  OF
THIS  CHAPTER  must  be granted where the people are not ready for trial
within:
  (a) six months of the commencement of  a  criminal  action  wherein  a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
  (b)  ninety  days  of  the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three
months and none of which is a felony;

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD13377-01-7

S. 7006                             2

  (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months;
  (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation OR A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTION and none of which is a
crime.
  2. Except as provided in subdivision [three]  FOUR  OF  THIS  SECTION,
where  a defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a
criminal action he OR SHE must be released on bail or on his OR HER  own
recognizance, upon such conditions as may be just and reasonable, if the
people are not ready for trial in that criminal action within:
  (a)  ninety days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
custody of the sheriff in a criminal action  wherein  the  defendant  is
accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
  (b)  thirty days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
custody of the sheriff in a criminal action  wherein  the  defendant  is
accused  of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor
punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three  months  and
none of which is a felony;
  (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a  misdemeanor
punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months
and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of
more than three months;
  (d) five days from the commencement of his OR HER  commitment  to  the
custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation OR
A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTION and none of which is a crime.
  3. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
PROVIDES  NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY MAKE
INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
ITS INQUIRY, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT  THE  PEOPLE  ARE  NOT  READY  TO
PROCEED  TO  TRIAL,  THE  PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READINESS
SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A  DEMAND  TO
PRODUCE  BY  A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO SECTION 240.20 OF THIS CHAPTER, ANY
STATEMENT OF TRIAL READINESS  MUST  BE  ACCOMPANIED  OR  PRECEDED  BY  A
CERTIFICATION  OF GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTION 240.20 OF THIS CHAPTER AND THE DEFENSE SHALL BE  AFFORDED  AN
OPPORTUNITY  TO  BE  HEARD  ON  THE  RECORD AS TO WHETHER THE DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT  APPLY  TO  CASES
WHERE THE DEFENSE HAS WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
  3-A.  UPON A MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, A STATEMENT OF READINESS SHALL NOT
BE VALID UNLESS THE  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY  CERTIFIES  THAT  ALL  COUNTS
CHARGED  IN  THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS
100.40 AND 100.15 AND, THOSE COUNTS  NOT  MEETING  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
SECTIONS 100.40 AND 100.15 OF THIS CHAPTER HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
  4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
  (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the

S. 7006                             3

specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
and there are reasonable grounds to  believe  that  such  evidence  will
become available in a reasonable period.
  (c)  A  motion  made pursuant to subdivision two OF THIS SECTION shall
not:
  (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
another offense;
  (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
  (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
  [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and  two  OF  THIS  SECTION,  the
following periods must be excluded:
  (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
or
  (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
consented  to  a  continuance  unless  he OR SHE has been advised by the
court of his OR HER rights under these rules and the effect  of  his  OR
HER consent, WHICH MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
  (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
  (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
bench  warrant pursuant to section 530.70 OF THIS CHAPTER because of the
defendant's failure to appear in court when required,  to  the  day  the
defendant  subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant
or voluntarily or otherwise; or
  (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
ance; or

S. 7006                             4

  (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
  (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
  (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
BY  THE COURT.   THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO THE REASONS
FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
  (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
this chapter[.]; OR
  (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.] OF THIS CHAPTER; OR
  (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
  6.  AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF  TRIAL
IN  A  CRIMINAL  ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE TO DO SO,
SHALL RULE ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING  SUCH
COURT  APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSES OF
COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR TRIAL WITH-
IN THE MEANING OF THIS SECTION; PROVIDED THAT SUCH RULING SHALL  NOT  BE
BINDING ON A DETERMINATION OF A MOTION MADE PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISIONS ONE
OR  TWO OF THIS SECTION.  THE COURT'S RULING SHALL BE NOTED IN THE COURT
FILE.
  7. IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE  MUST  BE  READY  FOR
TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO TIME ATTRIBUTABLE
TO COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
  8.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
TRAIL, PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS (B), (C) AND (D)  OF  SUBDIVISION  ONE  OF
THIS  SECTION,  NO  TIME  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  COURT  CONGESTION  SHALL  BE
EXCLUDED.
  [5.] 9. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on  the  date  the
withdrawal  of  the  plea  of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
retrial becomes final;

S. 7006                             5

  (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
  (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY  OF  THIS  CHAPTER  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed  pursuant  to section 190.70 OF THIS CHAPTER, the
period applicable for the purposes of subdivision one must be the period
applicable to the charges in the new accusatory  instrument,  calculated
from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided,
however,  that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time,
excluding the periods  provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE  OF  THIS
SECTION,  already  elapsed  from  the  date  of the filing of the felony
complaint to the date of the filing of  the  new  accusatory  instrument
exceeds  six  months, the period applicable to the charges in the felony
complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the  new  accusatory
instrument had not been filed;
  (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY  OF  THIS  CHAPTER  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed  pursuant  to section 190.70 OF THIS CHAPTER, the
period applicable for the purposes of subdivision two must be the period
applicable to the charges in the new accusatory  instrument,  calculated
from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided,
however,  that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time,
excluding the periods  provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE  OF  THIS
SECTION,  already  elapsed  from  the  date  of the filing of the felony
complaint to the date of the filing of  the  new  accusatory  instrument
exceeds  ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in the felony
complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the  new  accusatory
instrument had not been filed.
  (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20 OF THIS CHAPTER, the period applicable for the purposes of subdi-
vision one of this section must be the period applicable to the  charges
in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing
of  such  new  accusatory  instrument;  provided, however, that when the
aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding  the  periods
provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed
from the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing
of the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applica-
ble to the charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue
as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20 OF THIS CHAPTER, the period applicable for the purposes of subdi-
vision two of this section must be the period applicable to the  charges
in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing
of  such  new  accusatory  instrument;  provided, however, that when the
aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding  the  periods

S. 7006                             6

provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed
from the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing
of  the new accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period appli-
cable  to  the  charges  in  the  indictment  must remain applicable and
continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  [6.] 10. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions  one  through
seven  of  section  210.45  OF  THIS CHAPTER with respect to a motion to
dismiss an indictment are also applicable to a motion made  pursuant  to
subdivision two OF THIS SECTION.
  § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:
  6.  The  period  from  the filing of a motion pursuant to this section
until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
[four] FIVE of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason  of  such
motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
  § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
have become a law.

Co-Sponsors

S7006A - Details

Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S1738

S7006A - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

S7006A - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S7006A

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,

after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June

6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than
70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guide-
lines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the
People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.
Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the
prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As
a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood
before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and
got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-
month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2015-16: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

S7006A - Bill Text download pdf


                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                 7006--A

                            I N  S E N A T E

                               (PREFILED)

                             January 3, 2018
                               ___________

Introduced  by  Sens.  BAILEY,  ADDABBO,  ALCANTARA,  BRESLIN, CARLUCCI,
  COMRIE -- read twice and ordered  printed,  and  when  printed  to  be
  committed  to  the  Committee  on  Codes -- committee discharged, bill
  amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said  commit-
  tee

AN  ACT  to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
  for a speedy trial

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
  §  2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by chapter
184 of the laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3  as  amended  by
chapter  93  of  the  laws  of  2006,  paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 as
amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
vision 4 as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph  (i)  of
subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
of  subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994, paragraph
(b) of subdivision 5 as amended by chapter 109  of  the  laws  of  1982,
paragraphs  (e)  and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209 of the
laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
§ 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
  1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, a  motion
made  pursuant  to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
the people are not ready for trial within:
  (a) six months of the commencement of  a  criminal  action  wherein  a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
  (b)  ninety  days  of  the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three
months and none of which is a felony;

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD13377-02-8

S. 7006--A                          2

  (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months;
  (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
  2. Except as provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, where  a  defendant
has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
must  be  released  on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such condi-
tions as may be just and reasonable, if the people  are  not  ready  for
trial in that criminal action within:
  (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
  (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
one  or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable
by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three  months  and  none  of
which is a felony;
  (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the custo-
dy  of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused
of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punisha-
ble by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none
of which is a crime punishable by a sentence  of  imprisonment  of  more
than three months;
  (d)  five  days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
one  or  more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of
which is a crime.
  3. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
PROVIDES  NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY MAKE
INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
ITS INQUIRY, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT  THE  PEOPLE  ARE  NOT  READY  TO
PROCEED  TO  TRIAL,  THE  PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READINESS
SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A  DEMAND  TO
PRODUCE  BY  A  DEFENDANT  PURSUANT  TO SECTION 240.20, ANY STATEMENT OF
TRIAL READINESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY  A  CERTIFICATION  OF
GOOD  FAITH  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  OF SECTION
240.20. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE DEFENSE  HAS
WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.  THE DEFENSE SHALL BE AFFORDED AN OPPOR-
TUNITY  TO  BE  HEARD  ON  THE RECORD CONCERNING ANY SUCH INQUIRY BY THE
COURT, AND CONCERNING WHETHER SUCH  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  HAVE  BEEN
MET.
  3-A.  UPON A MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, A STATEMENT OF READINESS SHALL NOT
BE VALID UNLESS THE  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY  CERTIFIES  THAT  ALL  COUNTS
CHARGED  IN  THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS
100.15 AND 100.40 AND THOSE  COUNTS  NOT  MEETING  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
SECTIONS 100.15 AND 100.40 HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
  4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
  (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the

S. 7006--A                          3

specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
and there are reasonable grounds to  believe  that  such  evidence  will
become available in a reasonable period.
  (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
  (i)  apply  to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
another offense;
  (ii) require the release from custody of any  defendant  who  is  also
being  held  in  custody  pending trial of another criminal charge as to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
  (iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to  any  defendant
who,  after  being  released  from  custody  pursuant to this section or
otherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the  conditions  on
which  he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial proceed-
ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
  [4.] 5. In computing the time within which the people  must  be  ready
for  trial  pursuant  to subdivisions one and two, the following periods
must be excluded:
  (a) a reasonable period of  delay  resulting  from  other  proceedings
concerning  the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request  for  a  bill  of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period  during  which such matters are under consideration by the court;
or
  (b) the period of delay resulting from a continuance  granted  by  the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied  that  postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into
account the public interest  in  the  prompt  dispositions  of  criminal
charges.  A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to have
consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by  the  court  of
his OR HER rights under these rules and the effect of his consent, WHICH
MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
  (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
  (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
tarily or otherwise; or
  (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
ance; or
  (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such

S. 7006--A                          4

detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
  (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
  (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
BY  THE COURT.   THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO THE REASONS
FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
  (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
this chapter[.]; OR
  (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
  (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
  6. AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT  OF  TRIAL
IN  A  CRIMINAL  ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE TO DO SO,
SHALL RULE PRELIMINARILY ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT  PERIOD  IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING  SUCH  COURT APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR
THE PURPOSES OF COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY
FOR TRIAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THIS SECTION. THE COURT'S  RULING  SHALL
BE NOTED IN THE COURT FILE.
  7.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OR PARAGRAPHS (B),  (C),  OR  (D)  OF
SUBDIVISION   ONE  OF  THIS  SECTION,  NO  TIME  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  COURT
CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
  [5.] 8. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on  the  date  the
withdrawal  of  the  plea  of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
retrial becomes final;
  (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
  (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed

S. 7006--A                          5

pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
subdivision one must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
subdivision  two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  (e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision one of
this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed from the date
of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new
accusatory  instrument  exceeds six months, the period applicable to the
charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  two  of
this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to  the
charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  [6.] 9. The procedural rules prescribed in  subdivisions  one  through
seven  of  section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indict-
ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
  § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:

S. 7006--A                          6

  6. The period from the filing of a motion  pursuant  to  this  section
until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
[four]  FIVE  of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason of such
motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
  § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
have become a law.

Co-Sponsors

view additional co-sponsors

S7006B (ACTIVE) - Details

Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S1738

S7006B (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

S7006B (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S7006B

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,

after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June

6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than
70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guide-
lines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the
People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.
Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the
prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As
a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood
before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and
got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-
month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2015-16: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

S7006B (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf


                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                 7006--B

                            I N  S E N A T E

                               (PREFILED)

                             January 3, 2018
                               ___________

Introduced  by  Sens.  BAILEY,  ADDABBO,  ALCANTARA,  BRESLIN, CARLUCCI,
  COMRIE, RIVERA -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed  to
  be  committed  to the Committee on Codes -- committee discharged, bill
  amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said  commit-
  tee  --  committee  discharged,  bill  amended,  ordered  reprinted as
  amended and recommitted to said committee

AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
  for a speedy trial

  THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
  § 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
(b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
§ 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
  1.  Except  as  otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or  para-
graph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where the
people are not ready for trial within:
  (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
  (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD13377-03-8

S. 7006--B                          2

misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months and none of which is a felony;
  (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months; OR
  (d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action  wherein  the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
  (E)  FOR  THE  PURPOSES  OF  THIS  SUBDIVISION, THE TERM OFFENSE SHALL
INCLUDE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTIONS.
  2. Except as provided in subdivision three, where a defendant has been
committed to the custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE  OF  CHILDREN  AND
FAMILY  SERVICES in a criminal action he OR SHE must be released on bail
or on his OR HER own recognizance, upon such conditions as may  be  just
and  reasonable,  if the people are not ready for trial in that criminal
action within:
  (a) ninety days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to  the
custody  of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in
a criminal action wherein the  defendant  is  accused  of  one  or  more
offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
  (b)  thirty days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES  in
a  criminal  action  wherein  the  defendant  is  accused of one or more
offenses, at least one  of  which  is  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a
sentence  of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is
a felony;
  (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES  in
a  criminal  action  wherein  the  defendant  is  accused of one or more
offenses, at least one  of  which  is  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a
sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none of which
is  a  crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months; OR
  (d) five days from the commencement of his OR HER  commitment  to  the
custody  of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in
a criminal action wherein the  defendant  is  accused  of  one  or  more
offenses,  at  least  one of which is a violation and none of which is a
crime.
  (E) FOR THE PURPOSES OF  THIS  SUBDIVISION,  THE  TERM  OFFENSE  SHALL
INCLUDE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTIONS.
  3.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
  (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the
specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
district attorney has exercised due diligence to  obtain  such  evidence
and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to believe that such evidence will
become available in a reasonable period.
  (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:

S. 7006--B                          3

  (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
another offense;
  (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
  (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
  4.  In  computing  the  time within which the people must be ready for
trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following  periods  must
be excluded:
  (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
or
  (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
consented  to  a  continuance  unless  he OR SHE has been advised by the
court of his OR HER rights under these  rules  and  the  effect  of  his
consent, WHICH MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
  (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
  (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
tarily or otherwise; or
  (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
ance; or
  (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
  (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
  (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a

S. 7006--B                          4

continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE EVALUATED BY THE COURT AFTER INQUIRY  ON  THE
RECORD  AS TO THE REASONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS AND SHALL ONLY BE
APPROVED UPON A SHOWING OF SUFFICIENT SUPPORTING FACTS; OR
  (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
this chapter[.]; OR
  (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
  (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
  5. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
PROVIDES  NOTICE  THAT  THE  PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT SHALL
MAKE INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS  TO  THEIR  ACTUAL  READINESS.  IF,  AFTER
CONDUCTING  ITS  INQUIRY,  THE  COURT DETERMINES THAT THE PEOPLE ARE NOT
READY TO PROCEED TO TRIAL, THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READ-
INESS SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR  PURPOSES  OF  THIS  SECTION.  FOLLOWING  A
DEMAND  TO PRODUCE BY A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO SECTION 240.20, ANY STATE-
MENT OF TRIAL READINESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR  PRECEDED  BY  A  CERTIF-
ICATION  OF  GOOD  FAITH  COMPLIANCE WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 240.20 AND THE DEFENSE SHALL BE AFFORDED AN  OPPORTUNITY  TO  BE
HEARD  ON THE RECORD AS TO WHETHER THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN
MET. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO CASES  WHERE  THE  DEFENSE  HAS
WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
  5-A. UPON A LOCAL CRIMINAL COURT ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT, A STATEMENT OF
READINESS SHALL NOT BE VALID UNLESS ALL COUNTS CHARGED IN THE ACCUSATORY
INSTRUMENT  MEET  THE  REQUIREMENTS OF SUBDIVISIONS ONE, TWO OR THREE OF
SECTION 100.40 OF THIS CHAPTER AND THE PROSECUTION MOVES TO DISMISS  ANY
COUNTS NOT MEETING SUCH.
  6.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO PERIOD  OF  DELAY
RESULTING FROM COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
  7.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
TRIAL, PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS (B), (C) AND (D)  OF  SUBDIVISION  ONE  OF
THIS  SECTION,  NO PERIOD OF DELAY RESULTING FROM COURT CONGESTION SHALL
BE EXCLUDED.
  [5.] 8. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, if any,  must
be  deemed  to  have commenced on the date the withdrawal of the plea of
guilty or the date the order occasioning a retrial becomes final;

S. 7006--B                          5

  (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
  (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed
pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
subdivision one must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  four,  already  elapsed  from the date of the filing of the
felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instru-
ment exceeds six months, the period applicable to  the  charges  in  the
felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accu-
satory instrument had not been filed;
  (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed
pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
subdivision two must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  four,  already  elapsed  from the date of the filing of the
felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instru-
ment exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the  charges  in  the
felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accu-
satory instrument had not been filed.
  (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  one  of
this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date  of  the
filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument  exceeds  six months, the period applicable to the charges in
the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusa-
tory instrument had not been filed;
  (f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision two of
this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  four  of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory

S. 7006--B                          6

instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusa-
tory instrument had not been filed.
  [6.]  9.  The  procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through
seven of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss  an  indict-
ment  are [also] NOT applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision
two.  IF, UPON ORAL ARGUMENT, A TIME PERIOD IS  IN  DISPUTE,  THE  COURT
MUST  PROMPTLY CONDUCT A HEARING IN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THAT THE
TIME PERIOD IS EXCLUDABLE.
  § 3. Section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law is amended by adding
a new subdivision 6-a to read as follows:
  6-A. AN ORDER FINALLY DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO SUBDIVI-
SION ONE OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE REVIEWABLE  UPON  AN  APPEAL  FROM  AN
ENSUING  JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH JUDG-
MENT IS ENTERED UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY.
  § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
have become a law.

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senate Bill S7006B

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