BILL NUMBER: S6351

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:  An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in
relation to suspending jury deliberations

This is one in a series of measures being introduced at the request of
the Chief Administrative Judge upon the recorrunendation of his Advisory
Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure.

This measure would amend the Criminal Procedure. Law to allow a trial
court to suspend jury deliberations for up to three days (excluding
weekends and holidays) in appropriate cases.

In 1995, the Legislature gave trial courts discretion to forego seques-
tration in most cases (L. 1995, c. 83). Over the next several years, the
Legislature required the Chief Administrative Judge and the Office of
Court Administration to conduct an annual study of the change and file a
report with the Governor, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the Assembly. The reports found that the re were significant cost-sav-
ings to the change and that eliminating sequestration did not result in
an increase in jury tampering or an increase in the number of mistrials.
After five years, the Legislature made the changes permanent and
              

expanded the statute's reach to permit trial courts to forego sequestra-
tion in all cases (L. 2001, c. 47).

A trial court's discretion is not unfettered, however, and the current
statute provides that a court may only suspend jury deliberations "for a
reasonable period of time . . . not to exceed twenty-four hours" (CPL
310.10(2)). Undoubtedly, the twenty-four hour limit is intended to
permit deliberating jurors to go home each night and return on the next
day when the court is in session. Unfortunately, circumstances often
arise that make it impossible to reconvene the jury within twenty-four
hours, as was illustrated in a recent case arising in Kings County (see
People v. Taylor, 32 Misc. 3d 546 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2011, Del Giud-
ice, J.)). In Taylor, a deliberating juror was briefly hospitalized and
unable to return to court to resume further deliberations the following
day. The defense immediately moved for a mistrial, claiming that the
express language of CPL 310.10(2) prevented the court from adjourning
deliberations more than 24 hours, even though the juror would be avail-
able one day later. There were no indications of juror tampering nor did
it appear that jury deliberations would be impeded by the additional
delay caused by the juror's hospitalization. The case highlights the
inflexibility of the statute, and the court urged legislative action to
amend the statute.

We believe that the arbitrary limit of twenty-four hours should be
relaxed in appropriate cases. While our Advisory Committee initially
considered recommending elimination of the twenty-four hour restriction
altogether and allowing courts discretion to suspend deliberations "for
a reasonable period of time," it ultimately favored an approach that
provides courts with more, but not unfettered, discretion. Thus, this
measure allows the court to suspend jury deliberations and separate the
jury until the close of business on the second day following such
recess, or, "for good cause shown," until the close, of business on the
third day following the recess, not including weekends and holidays. The
measure also provides that a defendant may consent to a longer period of
suspension and separation. By requiring "good cause" for any suspension

longer than two business days, the measure ensures that lengthy suspen-
sions of jury deliberations will not become routine.

This measure, which would have no meaningful fiscal impact on the State,
would take effect immediately, and shall apply to all criminal actions
pending on or after such effective date.

 
2017-2018 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

Senate 6562 (Sen. Lanza)(Committed to Rules)

Assembly 7448 (M. of A. Lentol) (PASSED)

 
2015-2016 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

Senate 7373 (Sen. Nozzolio)(Committed to Rules)

Assembly 7031-A (M. of A. Lentol) (PASSED)