NY State Senate Bill S309B

Current Bill Status - Passed Senate

Introduced
In Committee
On Floor Calendar
- Passed Senate
- Passed Assembly
Delivered to Governor
Signed/Vetoed by Governor

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Actions

view actions (20)

	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
May 31, 2022	referred to election law delivered to assembly passed senate
May 05, 2022	advanced to third reading
May 04, 2022	2nd report cal.
May 03, 2022	1st report cal.991
Apr 25, 2022	reported and committed to finance
Apr 20, 2022	print number 309b
Apr 20, 2022	amend and recommit to elections
Jan 05, 2022	referred to elections returned to senate died in assembly
Jun 09, 2021	referred to election law delivered to assembly passed senate
Jun 07, 2021	ordered to third reading cal.1519 committee discharged and committed to rules
Jun 03, 2021	print number 309a
Jun 03, 2021	amend (t) and recommit to elections
Jan 06, 2021	referred to elections

Votes

view votes

May 31, 2022 - floor Vote

S309B

floor

Aye

Nay

Absent

Excused

Abstained

May 3, 2022 - Finance committee Vote

S309B

committee

Aye

Nay

Aye with Reservations

Absent

Excused

Abstained

Apr 25, 2022 - Elections committee Vote

S309B

committee

Aye

Nay

Aye with Reservations

Absent

Excused

Abstained

show Elections committee vote details

Elections Committee Vote: Apr 25, 2022

aye (3)

nay (2)

aye wr (1)

Kavanagh

excused (1)

Brouk

Jun 9, 2021 - floor Vote

S309A

floor

Aye

Nay

Absent

Excused

Abstained

Jun 7, 2021 - Rules committee Vote

S309A

committee

Aye

Nay

Aye with Reservations

Absent

Excused

Abstained

Bill Amendments

Original

B (Active)

Original

B (Active)

Co-Sponsors

view additional co-sponsors

S309 - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A1115
Law Section:: Election Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§7-104, 7-200 & 7-202, El L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S6733, A8597

S309 - Summary

Relates to construction of voting machines and systems.

S309 - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S309

SPONSOR: MYRIE
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the election law, in relation to construction of voting
machines and systems

 
PURPOSE:

This bill would improve the security of our elections by requiring that
any hybrid voting machines certified by the State Board of Election
should be constructed so that it is physically impossible for additional
marks to be mechanically added to the ballot once it has been cast by a
voter.

 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:

Section one amends paragraphs s and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202
of the election law, and adds a new paragraph u to require that any
voting machine certified by the State Board of Elections should be

constructed so that the paper path into the ballot box is physically
separate from the printer path.

Section two provides the effective date.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

The threat of the hacking of the machines that we rely on for free,
fair, and democratic elections is very real and requires us to take
every reasonable precaution to protect the bedrock of our republic and
all our other rights as Americans - our right to vote. A United States
Senate Intelligence Committee report released in July 2019 detailed how
hackers had likely targeted election systems and machines in all 50
states both in 2016 and in the midterm elections of 2018. Even more
alarming, some of those attempts at unauthorized access in Illinois and
Florida were successful.

To provide our voters with confidence that their cast ballot will
unquestionably and accountably reflect their preference and only their
preference, New York has instituted many common sense reforms, like
insisting on individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots as a
backup to electronic voting through a machine. However, there are many
different types of machines that provide secure electronic voting with a
paper backup, and questions have been raised specifically about the
security and potential physical flaws of so-called "hybrid" voting
machines, which combine a scanner and a ballot-marking device.

The intent of using a hybrid machine is to provide additional opportu-
nities for the voter to verify his or her vote. A voter makes their
selection on a screen, and then can either cast the vote 4s1S or print
out a copy of their ballot to visually inspect it before running it
through a scanner. For one such hybrid, the Dominion Imagecast Evolution
("Dominion ICE"), a potential flaw in its physical design has raised the
specter that a hacked machine could be programmed to add marks to a cast
ballot after it has been inspected by the voter, thereby changing the
ballot contrary to the will of the voter. Andrew W. Appel, the Eugene
Higgins Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer
Science at Princeton University, published an online description of the
flaw, specifically that in being scanned, the paper ballot passes a
second time under the print heads. His concern was shared by Richard A.
DeMillo, Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Distinguished Professor of
Computing in the Department of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute
of Technology, who wrote "absent a thorough and convincing design and
code review--there is no way to be confident that the system is immune
from the ballot stuffing attack he describes." Based on these published
concerns, Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair NYS Board of Elections requested
that the Election Operations Unit of the State Board examine again the
ImageCast Evolution to consider the vulnerability of the voting system
because the printer could be programmed to add marks to ballots without
verification by the voter.  Dominion sent a letter touting the benefits
of its hybrid machines, but did not specifically explain what they had
already or would in the future do to make it physically impossible for
an election fraud scenario as described by the professors to occur.

In New York State, 14 counties have purchased these specific hybrid
machine models. There are approximately 1.3 million eligible voters who
potentially could use these hybrid machines.

This bill would add the requirement to Election Law that any voting
machine certified by State Board of Elections that utilizes a hybrid
function should be constructed so that the paper path into the ballot
box is physically separate from the printer path, so that it would be
physically impossible for a ballot to go underneath a printer head after
it has been cast by a voter.

Since the risk that an electronic voting machine could be hacked through
malware or some other means can never be eliminated entirely, the least
we can do is guarantee the physical security of paper ballots by ensur-
ing it cannot physically be altered once cast by the voter.

 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

S6733 of 2019-20

 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:

None.

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
Immediately.

S309 - Bill Text download pdf

 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                    309
 
                        2021-2022 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 6, 2021
                                ___________
 
 Introduced by Sens. MYRIE, BIAGGI, HOYLMAN, MAYER, SKOUFIS -- read twice
   and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee
   on Elections
 
 AN  ACT to amend the election law, in relation to construction of voting
   machines and systems

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. Paragraphs s and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of the
 election  law,  as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, are amended
 and a new paragraph u is added to read as follows:
   s. permit alternative language accessibility pursuant to the  require-
 ments  of  section  203  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.
 1973aa-1a) such that it must have  the  capacity  to  display  the  full
 ballot  in  the  alternative  languages  required  by the federal Voting
 Rights Act if such voting machine or system is to  be  used  where  such
 alternative  languages  are required or where the local board deems such
 feature necessary; [and]
   t. not include any device  or  functionality  potentially  capable  of
 externally  transmitting or receiving data via the internet or via radio
 waves or via other wireless means[.]; AND
   U. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THAT, AFTER THE  PAPER  BALLOT  IS  CAST  BY  THE
 VOTER, THE VOTING MACHINE OR SYSTEM NEVER PASSES THE CAST BALLOT UNDER A
 PRINTER  THAT  CAN PRINT VOTES ONTO THE BALLOT, INCLUDING AS A RESULT OF
 UNAUTHORIZED, MALICIOUS AND/OR FAULTY SOFTWARE AND/OR FIRMWARE.
   § 2. This act shall take effect immediately.
 
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD02135-01-1

Co-Sponsors

view additional co-sponsors

S309A - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A1115
Law Section:: Election Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§7-104, 7-200 & 7-202, El L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S6733, A8597

S309A - Summary

Relates to construction of voting machines and systems.

S309A - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S309A

SPONSOR: MYRIE
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the election law, in relation to construction of and
requirements for voting machines and systems

 
PURPOSE:

To set forth requirements for voting machines and systems to provide
that the most secure and reliable voting machines and systems possible
are being purchased and utilized throughout the state.

 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:

Section one amends section 7-202 of the election the State law by amend-
ing paragraphs b,e,j,s and t and adds new paragraphs u,v,w,x, and y to
subdivision 1, and amending subdivision 4. This section amends para-
graphs b,e, and j, adding language to require machines to use independ-
ent, durable, voter-verified paper ballots, retain and produce a paper

ballot to allow for voter verification, and store the ballots in a
randomly cast order as opposed to chronological or sequential order. The
new paragraph u requires that a cast ballot never passes under a printer
that may add additional votes when corrupted by faulty or malicious
software or firmware. This paragraph allows machines purchased prior to
June 1, 2021 that contain this feature to still be used. Paragraph v
requires all machines, with the exception of those purchased before June
1, 2021, not contain ballot marking and scanning/tabulating features
within the same machine or system. Paragraph w requires machines not
utilize barcodes, matrix codes or other recording codes that cannot be
verified by the voter without a code-reading device.

Paragraph x requires machines or system must be constructed to allow for
the counting of ballots by hand, or with the use of an optical character
recognition device or other counting through the use of a non-tabulating
ballot marking device or system.

Paragraph y requires that the required paper ballots be printed in the
United States, and do not utilize thermal paper.

Subdivision 4 is amended to require local boards of election to purchase
optical scan machines.

Section two provides the effective date.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

The threat of the hacking of the machines that we rely on for free,
fair, and democratic elections is very real and requires us to take
every reasonable precaution to protect the bedrock of our republic and
all our other rights as Americans - our right to vote. A United States
Senate Intelligence Committee report released in July 2019 detailed how
hackers had likely targeted election systems and machines in all 50
states both in 2016 and in the midterm elections of 2018. Even more
alarming, some of those attempts at unauthorized access in Illinois and
Florida were successful.


To provide our voters with confidence that their cast ballot will
unquestionably and accountably reflect their preference and only their
preference, New York has instituted many common sense reforms, like
insisting on individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots as a
backup to electronic voting through a machine. However, there are many
different types of machines that provide secure electronic voting with a
paper backup, and questions have been raised specifically about the
security and potential physical flaws of so-called "hybrid" voting
machines, which combine a scanner and a ballot-marking device.

The intent of using a hybrid machine is to provide additional opportu-
nities for the voter to verify his or her vote. A voter makes their
selection on a screen, and then can either cast the vote 4s1S or print
out a copy of their ballot to visually inspect it before running it
through a scanner. For one such hybrid, the Dominion Imagecast Evolution
("Dominion ICE"), a potential flaw in its physical design has raised the
specter that a hacked machine could be programmed to add marks to a cast
ballot after it has been inspected by the voter, thereby changing the
ballot contrary to the will of the voter. Andrew W. Appel, the Eugene
Higgins Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer
Science at Princeton University, published an online description of the
flaw, specifically that in being scanned, the paper ballot passes a
second time under the print heads. His concern was shared by Richard A.
DeMillo, Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Distinguished Professor of
Computing in the Department of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute
of Technology, who wrote "absent a thorough and convincing design and
code review--there is no way to be confident that the system is immune
from the ballot stuffing attack he describes." Based on these published
concerns, Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair NYS Board of Elections requested
that the Election Operations Unit of the State Board examine again the
ImageCast Evolution to consider the vulnerability of the voting system
because the printer could be programmed to add marks to ballots without
verification by the voter.  Dominion sent a letter touting the benefits
of its hybrid machines, but did not specifically explain what they had
already or would in the future do to make it physically impossible for
an election fraud scenario as described by the professors to occur.

In New York State, 14 counties have purchased these specific hybrid
machine models. There are approximately 1.3 million eligible voters who
potentially could use these hybrid machines.

This bill would add the requirement to Election Law that any voting
machine certified by State Board of Elections that utilizes a hybrid
function should be constructed so that the paper path into the ballot
box is physically separate from the printer path, so that it would be
physically impossible for a ballot to go underneath a printer head after
it has been cast by a voter.

Since the risk that an electronic voting machine could be hacked through
malware or some other means can never be eliminated entirely, the least
we can do is guarantee the physical security of paper ballots by ensur-
ing it cannot physically be altered once cast by the voter.

 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

S6733 of 2019-20

 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
None.

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
Immediately.

S309A - Bill Text download pdf

 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                  309--A
 
                        2021-2022 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 6, 2021
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  MYRIE,  BAILEY, BENJAMIN, BIAGGI, BRESLIN, BROUK,
   COMRIE, COONEY, GIANARIS, HARCKHAM, HINCHEY, HOYLMAN, KAVANAGH, KRUEG-
   ER, MAY, MAYER, PARKER, REICHLIN-MELNICK, RIVERA, SKOUFIS, STAVISKY --
   read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to  be  committed  to
   the  Committee  on  Elections  --  committee discharged, bill amended,
   ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said committee
 
 AN ACT to amend the election law, in relation  to  construction  of  and
   requirements for voting machines and systems
 
   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. Paragraphs b, e, j, s and t of  subdivision  1  of  section
 7-202  of the election law, as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005,
 are amended and five new paragraphs u, v, w, x and y are added  to  read
 as follows:
   b.  permit  a  voter to vote for any person for any office, whether or
 not nominated as a candidate by any party or  independent  body  without
 the  ballot,  or any part thereof, being removed from the machine at any
 time AFTER THE BALLOT IS CAST;
   e. [provide the voter an opportunity to  privately  and  independently
 verify  votes  selected and the] REQUIRE THE USE OF AN INDIVIDUAL, DURA-
 BLE, VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOT OF THE VOTER'S  VOTE  THAT  SHALL  BE
 PRIVATELY  AND INDEPENDENTLY MARKED IN THE POLLING PLACE AND MADE AVAIL-
 ABLE FOR PRIVATE AND INDEPENDENT  INSPECTION  AND  VERIFICATION  BY  THE
 VOTER  BEFORE  THE VOTER'S VOTE IS CAST AND COUNTED, AND PROVIDE FOR THE
 VOTER'S ability to privately and  independently  change  such  votes  or
 correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted;
   j.  [retain all paper ballots cast or produce and retain a voter veri-
 fied permanent paper record which shall be presented to the  voter  from
 behind  a window or other device before the ballot is cast,] PRODUCE AND
 RETAIN A PAPER BALLOT WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED AND CAST BY THE VOTER  in  a
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD02135-12-1

 S. 309--A                           2
 
 manner  intended  and  designed  to  protect  the  privacy of the voter,
 INCLUDING STORING THE BALLOTS CAST IN RANDOM ORDER AND NOT  SEQUENTIALLY
 OR  CHRONOLOGICALLY  AS  CAST  BY VOTERS; such ballots [or record] shall
 allow  a  manual  audit  and  shall  be preserved in accordance with the
 provisions of section 3-222 of this chapter;
   s. permit alternative language accessibility pursuant to the  require-
 ments  of  section  203  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.
 1973aa-1a) such that it must have  the  capacity  to  display  the  full
 ballot  in  the  alternative  languages  required  by the federal Voting
 Rights Act if such voting machine or system is to  be  used  where  such
 alternative  languages  are required or where the local board deems such
 feature necessary; [and]
   t. not include any device  or  functionality  potentially  capable  of
 externally  transmitting or receiving data via the internet or via radio
 waves or via other wireless means[.];
   U. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THAT, AFTER THE  PAPER  BALLOT  IS  CAST  BY  THE
 VOTER, THE VOTING MACHINE OR SYSTEM NEVER PASSES THE CAST BALLOT UNDER A
 PRINTER  THAT  CAN PRINT VOTES ONTO THE BALLOT, INCLUDING AS A RESULT OF
 UNAUTHORIZED, MALICIOUS OR FAULTY SOFTWARE OR  FIRMWARE,  PROVIDED  THAT
 MACHINES  PURCHASED  PRIOR  TO  JUNE  FIRST, TWO THOUSAND TWENTY-ONE MAY
 CONTINUE TO BE USED;
   V. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THE CONFIGURATION OR FUNCTIONALITY  OF  A  VOTING
 MACHINE  OR SYSTEM DOES NOT INCLUDE BALLOT MARKING AND TABULATING WITHIN
 THE SAME PHYSICAL DEVICE, PROVIDED THAT MACHINES PURCHASED PRIOR TO JUNE
 FIRST, TWO THOUSAND TWENTY-ONE MAY CONTINUE TO BE USED;
   W. NOT UTILIZE, FOR THE PROCESS OF VOTE CASTING AND CANVASSING, A  BAR
 CODE,  MATRIX CODE OR ANY KIND OF RECORDING CODE THAT CANNOT BE VERIFIED
 BY THE VOTER WITHOUT USING A CODE-READING DEVICE;
   X. PERMIT THE COUNTING OF BALLOTS BY HAND OR  PERMIT  THE  READING  OF
 BALLOTS WITH AN OPTICAL CHARACTER RECOGNITION DEVICE; AND
   Y.  USE  DURABLE  PAPER BALLOTS PRINTED AND MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED
 STATES THAT ARE NOT PRINTED ON THERMAL PAPER.
   § 2. Subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, as  added  by
 chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, is amended to read as follows:
   4.  Local boards of elections which obtain voting machines pursuant to
 this chapter [may determine to] SHALL purchase [direct  recording  elec-
 tronic  machines  or]  optical  scan  machines  in  conformance with the
 requirements of this chapter.
   § 3. This act shall take effect immediately.

Co-Sponsors

view additional co-sponsors

S309B (ACTIVE) - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A1115
Law Section:: Election Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§7-104, 7-200 & 7-202, El L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S6733, A8597

S309B (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to construction of voting machines and systems.

S309B (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S309B

SPONSOR: MYRIE
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the election law, in relation to construction of and
requirements for voting machines and systems

 
PURPOSE:

To amend the requirements for voting machines and systems to ensure that
the most secure and reliable voting machines and systems possible are
being purchased and utilized throughout the state; to ensure that
ballots are printed on durable paper; to outlaw direct electronic voting
machines that do not utilize paper ballots; to give boards of election
the flexibility to use more than two types of voting machines per
election; and to give voters the option, at every polling place, to mark
a paper ballot by hand or with a nontabulating ballot marking device.

 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:

Section one of the bill amends section 7-104 of the election law to add

a new section 28, which will require ballots to be printed on durable
paper and sets forth a definition of durable paper.

Section two of the bill amends subdivision 1 of section 7-200 of the
election law to eliminate the rule that local boards of election can
only use two types of voting machines at a single election.

Section three of the bill amends subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of the
election law by amending paragraphs b, e, j, s and t and adding new
paragraphs u, v and w. The amendments to paragraphs b, e and j remove
language that permitted direct recording electronic voting (machines
that do not accept paper ballots); add language to ensure that voters
have the right to vote independently and privately on an individually
marked, voter verifiable paper ballot that is either hand-marked or
marked using a nontabulating ballot marking device; define a nontabulat-
ing ballot marking device; and provide for the retention of paper
ballots in a manner designed to protect voter privacy. The new para-
graphs u and v add voting machine requirements that ban so-called hybrid
or all-in-one voting machines, which combine a printer and a scanner.
Paragraph u would prohibit the certification of voting machines or
systems, which after voters have an opportunity to review their ballots,
pass the ballot under a printer that could add additional votes not
authorized by the voter. Paragraph v prohibits certification of voting
machines or systems that contain ballot marking and tabulating, trans-
mitting or retention features within the same physical device, which
would also ban certain types of hybrid voting machines. Paragraph w
prohibits voting machines or systems from encoding votes with barcodes,
QR codes and other recording codes that cannot be verified by the voter
without a code-reading device.

Section four of the bill amends subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the
election law and adds a new subdivision 5. Subdivision 4 is amended to
require local boards of election to purchase ballot scanners and nontab-
ulating ballot marking devices and eliminates the option to purchase
direct recording electronic voting machines, which do not produce paper
ballots for use in audits. The new subdivision 5 requires local boards
of election to provide voters at every polling place with the option to
either hand mark a paper ballot or use a nontabulating ballot marking
device or system to mark a paper ballot.

Section five of the bill provides the effective date. The law will take
effect immediately, except that local boards of elections that bought
noncompliant machines or systems prior to the effective date will not be
required to replace those machines to comply with section three, para-
graphs (u) and (v) subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of the election law,
and section 4, subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, of
this legislation. The bill permits local boards to use and maintain
non-compliant machines or systems purchased before the effective date,
and to replace non-compliant machines or systems bought before the
effective date, but only with identical model non-compliant machines or
systems made by the same manufacturer, or identical model machines or
systems made by the same manufacturer with de minimis changes approved
by the state board of elections.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

The threat of the hacking of the machines that we rely on for free,
fait, and democratic elections is very real and requires us to take
every reasonable precaution to protect the bedrock of our republic and
all our other rights as Americans - our right to vote. A United States
Senate Intelligence Committee report released in July 2019 detailed how
hackers had likely targeted election systems and machines in all 50
states both in 2016 and in the midterm elections of 2018. Even more
alarming, some of those attempts at unauthorized access in Illinois and
Florida were successful.

To provide our voters with confidence that their cast ballot will
unquestionably and accountably reflect their preference and only their
preference, New York has instituted many common sense reforms, like
insisting on individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots as a
backup to electronic voting through a machine. However, there are many
different types of machines that provide secure electronic voting with a
paper backup, and questions have been raised specifically about the
security and potential physical flaws of so-called "hybrid" voting
machines, which combine a scanner and a ballot-marking device.

The intent of using a hybrid machine is to provide additional opportu-
nities for the voter to verify his or her vote. A voter makes their
selection on a screen, and then can either cast the vote 4s1S or print
out a copy of their ballot to visually inspect it before running it
through a scanner. For one such hybrid, the Dominion Imagecast Evolution
("Dominion ICE"), a potential flaw in its physical design has raised the
specter that a hacked machine could be programmed to add marks to a cast
ballot after it has been inspected by the voter, thereby changing the
ballot contrary to the will of the voter. Andrew W. Appel, the Eugene
Higgins Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer
Science at Princeton University, published an online description of the
flaw, specifically that in being scanned, the paper ballot passes a
second time under the print heads. His concern was shared by Richard A.
DeMillo, Charlotte B. and Roger C.  Warren Distinguished Professor of
Computing in the Department of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute
of Technology, who wrote "absent a thorough and convincing design and
code review--there is no way to be confident that the system is immune
from the ballot stuffing attack he describes." Based on these published
concerns, Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair NYS Board of Elections requested
that the Election Operations Unit of the State Board examine again the
ImageCast Evolution to consider the vulnerability of the voting system
because the printer could be programmed to add marks to ballots without
verification by the voter. Dominion sent a letter touting the benefits
of its hybrid machines, but did not specifically explain what they had
already or would in the future do to make it physically impossible for
an election fraud scenario as described by the professors to occur.

In New York State, 14 counties have purchased these specific hybrid
machine models. There are approximately 1.3 million eligible voters who
potentially could use these hybrid machines.

This bill would add the requirement to Election Law that any voting
machine certified by State Board of Elections that utilizes a hybrid
function should be constructed so that the paper path into the ballot
box is physically separate from the printer path, so that it would be
physically impossible for a ballot to go underneath a printer head after
it has been cast by a voter.

Since the risk that an electronic voting machine could be hacked through
malware or some other means can never be eliminated entirely, the least
we can do is guarantee the physical security of paper ballots by ensur-
ing it cannot physically be altered once cast by the voter.

 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

S6733 of 2019-20

 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:

None.

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
Immediately; provided, however, that any local board of elections that
purchased voting machines or systems prior to such date which are not in
compliance with the requirements of paragraph u or v of subdivision 1
and subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, may continue to
use, maintain and replace such voting machines and systems, but may
replace them only with identical model voting machines or systems made
by the same manufacturer, or identical model voting machines or systems
with de minimis changes in such voting machines' or systems' hardware,
software, technical data package, or data, the nature of which will not
materially alter the voting machines' or systems' reliability, function-
ality, capability, or operation; any de minimis changes shall be
approved by the state board of elections.

S309B (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                  309--B
 
                        2021-2022 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 6, 2021
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  MYRIE,  ADDABBO,  BAILEY, BIAGGI, BRESLIN, BROUK,
   COMRIE,  COONEY,  GIANARIS,  HARCKHAM,  HINCHEY,   HOYLMAN,   JACKSON,
   KAVANAGH, KRUEGER, MAY, MAYER, PARKER, REICHLIN-MELNICK, RIVERA, SALA-
   ZAR,  SKOUFIS,  STAVISKY  --  read twice and ordered printed, and when
   printed to be committed to the Committee  on  Elections  --  committee
   discharged, bill amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted
   to  said  committee  --  recommitted  to the Committee on Elections in
   accordance with Senate Rule 6, sec. 8 --  committee  discharged,  bill
   amended,  ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said commit-
   tee
 
 AN ACT to amend the election law, in relation  to  construction  of  and
   requirements for voting machines and systems
 
   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. Section 7-104 of the election law is amended  by  adding  a
 new subdivision 28 to read as follows:
   28.  THE  BALLOT  SHALL  BE  MARKED  OR  PRINTED ON DURABLE PAPER. FOR
 PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, "DURABLE PAPER" IS DEFINED AS PAPER CAPABLE OF
 WITHSTANDING MULTIPLE COUNTS AND RECOUNTS BY  HAND  OR  MACHINE  WITHOUT
 COMPROMISING  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOTS, AND CAPABLE OF
 RETAINING THE INFORMATION MARKED OR PRINTED ON SUCH PAPER FOR  THE  FULL
 DURATION  OF  A  RETENTION  AND PRESERVATION PERIOD SET FORTH IN SECTION
 3-222 OF THIS CHAPTER.
   § 2. Subdivision 1 of section 7-200 of the election law, as amended by
 chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, is amended to read as follows:
   1. The board of elections of the city of New  York  and  other  county
 boards  of  elections  may  adopt  any  kind of voting machine or system
 approved by the state board of elections, or the use of which  has  been
 specifically  authorized  by  law;  and thereupon such voting machine or
 system may be used at any or all elections and  shall  be  used  at  all
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.

                                                            LBD02135-30-2
 S. 309--B                           2
 
 general  or  special elections held by such boards in such city, town or
 village and in every contested primary election in the city of New  York
 and  in every contested primary election outside the city of New York in
 which  there are one thousand or more enrolled voters qualified to vote.
 [No more than two types of voting machines or systems may be used by any
 local board of elections at  a  single  election.]  Notwithstanding  the
 other  provisions  of this subdivision, any local board of elections may
 borrow or lease for use on an experimental basis for  a  period  of  not
 more than one year each, voting machines or systems of any type approved
 by the state board of elections.
   §  3. Paragraphs b, e, j, s and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of
 the election law, as added by chapter 181  of  the  laws  of  2005,  are
 amended  and  three  new  paragraphs  u,  v  and  w are added to read as
 follows:
   b. permit a voter to vote for any person for any  office,  whether  or
 not  nominated  as a candidate by any party or independent body [without
 the ballot, or any part thereof, being removed from the machine  at  any
 time];
   e.  provide  the  voter  an opportunity to privately and independently
 MARK AND verify votes selected [and the] ON AN INDIVIDUAL, VOTER-VERIFI-
 ABLE PAPER BALLOT AND THE ability to privately and independently  change
 such  votes  or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted,
 INCLUDING BY OFFERING THE VOTER A NEW PAPER BALLOT AS MANY TIMES  AS  IS
 ALLOWED  BY STATUTE OR REGULATION. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SUBDIVISION,
 THE TERM "INDIVIDUAL, VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOT" MEANS EITHER: (I) A
 PAPER BALLOT MARKED BY THE VOTER BY HAND; OR (II) A PAPER BALLOT  MARKED
 THROUGH  THE USE OF A NONTABULATING BALLOT MARKING DEVICE OR SYSTEM. FOR
 THE PURPOSES OF THIS TITLE, A "BALLOT MARKING DEVICE" IS A  DEVICE  THAT
 PROVIDES VOTERS, INCLUDING VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES, THE ABILITY TO MARK
 VOTES  ON  PHYSICAL,  PAPER BALLOTS PRIVATELY AND INDEPENDENTLY. FOR THE
 PURPOSES OF THIS TITLE, A "NONTABULATING BALLOT  MARKING  DEVICE"  IS  A
 BALLOT MARKING DEVICE THAT DOES NOT TABULATE OR TRANSMIT VOTES OR RETAIN
 ANY  RECORD  OF  A  VOTER'S  SELECTIONS,  OTHER  THAN THE ORIGINAL PAPER
 BALLOT, AFTER THE VOTER HAS FINISHED MARKING THE PAPER BALLOT AND  USING
 THE DEVICE TO REVIEW SELECTIONS;
   j.  [retain all paper ballots cast or produce and retain a voter veri-
 fied permanent paper record which shall be presented to the  voter  from
 behind  a  window or other device before the ballot is cast,] FOR BALLOT
 SCANNERS, RETAIN PAPER BALLOTS IN A  MANNER  INTENDED  AND  DESIGNED  TO
 PROTECT  THE  PRIVACY  OF  THE  VOTER;  FOR NONTABULATING BALLOT MARKING
 DEVICES, PRODUCE OR PROCESS PAPER  BALLOTS  in  a  manner  intended  and
 designed  to  protect the privacy of the voter; such ballots [or record]
 shall allow a manual audit and shall be preserved in accordance with the
 provisions of section 3-222 of this chapter;
   s. permit alternative language accessibility pursuant to the  require-
 ments  of  section  203  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.
 1973aa-1a) such that it must have  the  capacity  to  display  the  full
 ballot  in  the  alternative  languages  required  by the federal Voting
 Rights Act if such voting machine or system is to  be  used  where  such
 alternative  languages  are required or where the local board deems such
 feature necessary; [and]
   t. not include any device  or  functionality  potentially  capable  of
 externally  transmitting or receiving data via the internet or via radio
 waves or via other wireless means[.];
   U. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THAT, AFTER THE  PAPER  BALLOT  IS  CAST  BY  THE
 VOTER, THE VOTING MACHINE OR SYSTEM NEVER PASSES THE CAST BALLOT UNDER A
 S. 309--B                           3
 
 PRINTER  THAT  CAN PRINT VOTES ONTO THE BALLOT, INCLUDING AS A RESULT OF
 UNAUTHORIZED, MALICIOUS OR FAULTY SOFTWARE OR FIRMWARE;
   V.  BE  CONSTRUCTED  SO THE CONFIGURATION OR FUNCTIONALITY OF A VOTING
 MACHINE OR SYSTEM DOES NOT INCLUDE, WITHIN  THE  SAME  PHYSICAL  DEVICE,
 BOTH  (I)  BALLOT  MARKING AND (II) TABULATING OR TRANSMITTING A VOTER'S
 SELECTIONS AT ANY TIME OR RETAINING ANY RECORD OF A VOTER'S  SELECTIONS,
 OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL PAPER BALLOT, AFTER THE VOTER HAS FINISHED MARK-
 ING THE PAPER BALLOT AND USING THE DEVICE TO REVIEW SELECTIONS; AND
   W.  NOT ENCODE VOTES ON A BALLOT, WHETHER AS A BARCODE, QR CODE OR ANY
 KIND OF RECORDING CODE THAT CANNOT BE  VERIFIED  BY  THE  VOTER  WITHOUT
 USING A CODE-READING DEVICE. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS PARAGRAPH, A "CODE
 READING  DEVICE"  IS A DEVICE THAT READS AND TRANSLATES CODED MARKS LIKE
 QR CODES OR BARCODES INTO LANGUAGE THAT CAN BE  UNDERSTOOD  WITHOUT  ANY
 KIND OF DEVICE.
   §  4.  Subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, as added by
 chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, is amended and a new subdivision  5  is
 added to read as follows:
   4.  Local boards of elections which obtain voting machines pursuant to
 this chapter [may determine to] SHALL purchase [direct  recording  elec-
 tronic  machines  or optical scan machines] BALLOT SCANNERS AND NONTABU-
 LATING BALLOT MARKING DEVICES in conformance with  the  requirements  of
 this chapter.
   5.  LOCAL BOARDS OF ELECTIONS MUST PROVIDE EVERY VOTER, AT EVERY POLL-
 ING PLACE, BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS:  (A)  TO  HAND  MARK  A  PAPER
 BALLOT; OR (B) TO USE A NONTABULATING BALLOT MARKING DEVICE OR SYSTEM TO
 MARK  A  PAPER BALLOT. ALL PAPER BALLOTS MUST BE PRINTED, SCANNABLE, AND
 INCLUDE ALL RELEVANT CONTESTS AND CANDIDATES.
   § 5. This act shall take effect immediately; provided,  however,  that
 any  local  board of elections that purchased voting machines or systems
 prior to such date which are not in compliance with the requirements  of
 paragraph  u or v of subdivision 1 and subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of
 the election law, may continue to use, maintain and replace such  voting
 machines  and  systems,  but  may replace them only with identical model
 voting machines or systems made by the same manufacturer,  or  identical
 model  voting machines or systems with de minimis changes in such voting
 machines' or systems' hardware, software,  technical  data  package,  or
 data, the nature of which will not materially alter the voting machines'
 or systems' reliability, functionality, capability, or operation; any de
 minimis changes shall be approved by the state board of elections.

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The New York State Senate

senate Bill S309B

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senate Bill S309B

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Current Bill Status - Passed Senate

Your Voice

Actions

Votes

May 31, 2022 - floor Vote

Floor Vote: May 31, 2022

May 3, 2022 - Finance committee Vote

Finance Committee Vote: May 3, 2022

Apr 25, 2022 - Elections committee Vote

Elections Committee Vote: Apr 25, 2022

Jun 9, 2021 - floor Vote

Floor Vote: Jun 9, 2021

Jun 7, 2021 - Rules committee Vote

Committee Vote: Jun 7, 2021

Bill Amendments

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S309 - Details

S309 - Summary

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S309 - Bill Text download pdf

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S309A - Details

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