NY State Senate Bill S309A

Current Bill Status - Passed Senate

Introduced
In Committee
On Floor Calendar
- Passed Senate
- Passed Assembly
Delivered to Governor
Signed/Vetoed by Governor

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Actions

view actions (8)

	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
Jun 09, 2021	referred to election law delivered to assembly passed senate
Jun 07, 2021	ordered to third reading cal.1519 committee discharged and committed to rules
Jun 03, 2021	print number 309a
Jun 03, 2021	amend (t) and recommit to elections
Jan 06, 2021	referred to elections

Votes

Bill Amendments

Original

A (Active)

Original

A (Active)

Co-Sponsors

view additional co-sponsors

S309 - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A1115
Law Section:: Election Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §7-202, El L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S6733, A8597

S309 - Summary

Relates to construction of voting machines and systems.

S309 - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S309

SPONSOR: MYRIE
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the election law, in relation to construction of voting
machines and systems

 
PURPOSE:

This bill would improve the security of our elections by requiring that
any hybrid voting machines certified by the State Board of Election
should be constructed so that it is physically impossible for additional
marks to be mechanically added to the ballot once it has been cast by a
voter.

 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:

Section one amends paragraphs s and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202
of the election law, and adds a new paragraph u to require that any
voting machine certified by the State Board of Elections should be

constructed so that the paper path into the ballot box is physically
separate from the printer path.

Section two provides the effective date.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

The threat of the hacking of the machines that we rely on for free,
fair, and democratic elections is very real and requires us to take
every reasonable precaution to protect the bedrock of our republic and
all our other rights as Americans - our right to vote. A United States
Senate Intelligence Committee report released in July 2019 detailed how
hackers had likely targeted election systems and machines in all 50
states both in 2016 and in the midterm elections of 2018. Even more
alarming, some of those attempts at unauthorized access in Illinois and
Florida were successful.

To provide our voters with confidence that their cast ballot will
unquestionably and accountably reflect their preference and only their
preference, New York has instituted many common sense reforms, like
insisting on individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots as a
backup to electronic voting through a machine. However, there are many
different types of machines that provide secure electronic voting with a
paper backup, and questions have been raised specifically about the
security and potential physical flaws of so-called "hybrid" voting
machines, which combine a scanner and a ballot-marking device.

The intent of using a hybrid machine is to provide additional opportu-
nities for the voter to verify his or her vote. A voter makes their
selection on a screen, and then can either cast the vote 4s1S or print
out a copy of their ballot to visually inspect it before running it
through a scanner. For one such hybrid, the Dominion Imagecast Evolution
("Dominion ICE"), a potential flaw in its physical design has raised the
specter that a hacked machine could be programmed to add marks to a cast
ballot after it has been inspected by the voter, thereby changing the
ballot contrary to the will of the voter. Andrew W. Appel, the Eugene
Higgins Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer
Science at Princeton University, published an online description of the
flaw, specifically that in being scanned, the paper ballot passes a
second time under the print heads. His concern was shared by Richard A.
DeMillo, Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Distinguished Professor of
Computing in the Department of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute
of Technology, who wrote "absent a thorough and convincing design and
code review--there is no way to be confident that the system is immune
from the ballot stuffing attack he describes." Based on these published
concerns, Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair NYS Board of Elections requested
that the Election Operations Unit of the State Board examine again the
ImageCast Evolution to consider the vulnerability of the voting system
because the printer could be programmed to add marks to ballots without
verification by the voter.  Dominion sent a letter touting the benefits
of its hybrid machines, but did not specifically explain what they had
already or would in the future do to make it physically impossible for
an election fraud scenario as described by the professors to occur.

In New York State, 14 counties have purchased these specific hybrid
machine models. There are approximately 1.3 million eligible voters who
potentially could use these hybrid machines.

This bill would add the requirement to Election Law that any voting
machine certified by State Board of Elections that utilizes a hybrid
function should be constructed so that the paper path into the ballot
box is physically separate from the printer path, so that it would be
physically impossible for a ballot to go underneath a printer head after
it has been cast by a voter.

Since the risk that an electronic voting machine could be hacked through
malware or some other means can never be eliminated entirely, the least
we can do is guarantee the physical security of paper ballots by ensur-
ing it cannot physically be altered once cast by the voter.

 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

S6733 of 2019-20

 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:

None.

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
Immediately.

S309 - Bill Text download pdf

 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                    309
 
                        2021-2022 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 6, 2021
                                ___________
 
 Introduced by Sens. MYRIE, BIAGGI, HOYLMAN, MAYER, SKOUFIS -- read twice
   and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee
   on Elections
 
 AN  ACT to amend the election law, in relation to construction of voting
   machines and systems

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. Paragraphs s and t of subdivision 1 of section 7-202 of the
 election  law,  as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, are amended
 and a new paragraph u is added to read as follows:
   s. permit alternative language accessibility pursuant to the  require-
 ments  of  section  203  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.
 1973aa-1a) such that it must have  the  capacity  to  display  the  full
 ballot  in  the  alternative  languages  required  by the federal Voting
 Rights Act if such voting machine or system is to  be  used  where  such
 alternative  languages  are required or where the local board deems such
 feature necessary; [and]
   t. not include any device  or  functionality  potentially  capable  of
 externally  transmitting or receiving data via the internet or via radio
 waves or via other wireless means[.]; AND
   U. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THAT, AFTER THE  PAPER  BALLOT  IS  CAST  BY  THE
 VOTER, THE VOTING MACHINE OR SYSTEM NEVER PASSES THE CAST BALLOT UNDER A
 PRINTER  THAT  CAN PRINT VOTES ONTO THE BALLOT, INCLUDING AS A RESULT OF
 UNAUTHORIZED, MALICIOUS AND/OR FAULTY SOFTWARE AND/OR FIRMWARE.
   § 2. This act shall take effect immediately.
 
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD02135-01-1

Co-Sponsors

view additional co-sponsors

S309A (ACTIVE) - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A1115
Law Section:: Election Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §7-202, El L
Versions Introduced in 2019-2020 Legislative Session:: S6733, A8597

S309A (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to construction of voting machines and systems.

S309A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

 
BILL NUMBER: S309A

SPONSOR: MYRIE
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the election law, in relation to construction of and
requirements for voting machines and systems

 
PURPOSE:

To set forth requirements for voting machines and systems to provide
that the most secure and reliable voting machines and systems possible
are being purchased and utilized throughout the state.

 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:

Section one amends section 7-202 of the election the State law by amend-
ing paragraphs b,e,j,s and t and adds new paragraphs u,v,w,x, and y to
subdivision 1, and amending subdivision 4. This section amends para-
graphs b,e, and j, adding language to require machines to use independ-
ent, durable, voter-verified paper ballots, retain and produce a paper

ballot to allow for voter verification, and store the ballots in a
randomly cast order as opposed to chronological or sequential order. The
new paragraph u requires that a cast ballot never passes under a printer
that may add additional votes when corrupted by faulty or malicious
software or firmware. This paragraph allows machines purchased prior to
June 1, 2021 that contain this feature to still be used. Paragraph v
requires all machines, with the exception of those purchased before June
1, 2021, not contain ballot marking and scanning/tabulating features
within the same machine or system. Paragraph w requires machines not
utilize barcodes, matrix codes or other recording codes that cannot be
verified by the voter without a code-reading device.

Paragraph x requires machines or system must be constructed to allow for
the counting of ballots by hand, or with the use of an optical character
recognition device or other counting through the use of a non-tabulating
ballot marking device or system.

Paragraph y requires that the required paper ballots be printed in the
United States, and do not utilize thermal paper.

Subdivision 4 is amended to require local boards of election to purchase
optical scan machines.

Section two provides the effective date.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

The threat of the hacking of the machines that we rely on for free,
fair, and democratic elections is very real and requires us to take
every reasonable precaution to protect the bedrock of our republic and
all our other rights as Americans - our right to vote. A United States
Senate Intelligence Committee report released in July 2019 detailed how
hackers had likely targeted election systems and machines in all 50
states both in 2016 and in the midterm elections of 2018. Even more
alarming, some of those attempts at unauthorized access in Illinois and
Florida were successful.


To provide our voters with confidence that their cast ballot will
unquestionably and accountably reflect their preference and only their
preference, New York has instituted many common sense reforms, like
insisting on individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots as a
backup to electronic voting through a machine. However, there are many
different types of machines that provide secure electronic voting with a
paper backup, and questions have been raised specifically about the
security and potential physical flaws of so-called "hybrid" voting
machines, which combine a scanner and a ballot-marking device.

The intent of using a hybrid machine is to provide additional opportu-
nities for the voter to verify his or her vote. A voter makes their
selection on a screen, and then can either cast the vote 4s1S or print
out a copy of their ballot to visually inspect it before running it
through a scanner. For one such hybrid, the Dominion Imagecast Evolution
("Dominion ICE"), a potential flaw in its physical design has raised the
specter that a hacked machine could be programmed to add marks to a cast
ballot after it has been inspected by the voter, thereby changing the
ballot contrary to the will of the voter. Andrew W. Appel, the Eugene
Higgins Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer
Science at Princeton University, published an online description of the
flaw, specifically that in being scanned, the paper ballot passes a
second time under the print heads. His concern was shared by Richard A.
DeMillo, Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Distinguished Professor of
Computing in the Department of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute
of Technology, who wrote "absent a thorough and convincing design and
code review--there is no way to be confident that the system is immune
from the ballot stuffing attack he describes." Based on these published
concerns, Douglas A. Kellner Co-Chair NYS Board of Elections requested
that the Election Operations Unit of the State Board examine again the
ImageCast Evolution to consider the vulnerability of the voting system
because the printer could be programmed to add marks to ballots without
verification by the voter.  Dominion sent a letter touting the benefits
of its hybrid machines, but did not specifically explain what they had
already or would in the future do to make it physically impossible for
an election fraud scenario as described by the professors to occur.

In New York State, 14 counties have purchased these specific hybrid
machine models. There are approximately 1.3 million eligible voters who
potentially could use these hybrid machines.

This bill would add the requirement to Election Law that any voting
machine certified by State Board of Elections that utilizes a hybrid
function should be constructed so that the paper path into the ballot
box is physically separate from the printer path, so that it would be
physically impossible for a ballot to go underneath a printer head after
it has been cast by a voter.

Since the risk that an electronic voting machine could be hacked through
malware or some other means can never be eliminated entirely, the least
we can do is guarantee the physical security of paper ballots by ensur-
ing it cannot physically be altered once cast by the voter.

 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

S6733 of 2019-20

 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
None.

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
Immediately.

S309A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                  309--A
 
                        2021-2022 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 6, 2021
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  MYRIE,  BAILEY, BENJAMIN, BIAGGI, BRESLIN, BROUK,
   COMRIE, COONEY, GIANARIS, HARCKHAM, HINCHEY, HOYLMAN, KAVANAGH, KRUEG-
   ER, MAY, MAYER, PARKER, REICHLIN-MELNICK, RIVERA, SKOUFIS, STAVISKY --
   read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to  be  committed  to
   the  Committee  on  Elections  --  committee discharged, bill amended,
   ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said committee
 
 AN ACT to amend the election law, in relation  to  construction  of  and
   requirements for voting machines and systems
 
   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. Paragraphs b, e, j, s and t of  subdivision  1  of  section
 7-202  of the election law, as added by chapter 181 of the laws of 2005,
 are amended and five new paragraphs u, v, w, x and y are added  to  read
 as follows:
   b.  permit  a  voter to vote for any person for any office, whether or
 not nominated as a candidate by any party or  independent  body  without
 the  ballot,  or any part thereof, being removed from the machine at any
 time AFTER THE BALLOT IS CAST;
   e. [provide the voter an opportunity to  privately  and  independently
 verify  votes  selected and the] REQUIRE THE USE OF AN INDIVIDUAL, DURA-
 BLE, VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOT OF THE VOTER'S  VOTE  THAT  SHALL  BE
 PRIVATELY  AND INDEPENDENTLY MARKED IN THE POLLING PLACE AND MADE AVAIL-
 ABLE FOR PRIVATE AND INDEPENDENT  INSPECTION  AND  VERIFICATION  BY  THE
 VOTER  BEFORE  THE VOTER'S VOTE IS CAST AND COUNTED, AND PROVIDE FOR THE
 VOTER'S ability to privately and  independently  change  such  votes  or
 correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted;
   j.  [retain all paper ballots cast or produce and retain a voter veri-
 fied permanent paper record which shall be presented to the  voter  from
 behind  a window or other device before the ballot is cast,] PRODUCE AND
 RETAIN A PAPER BALLOT WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED AND CAST BY THE VOTER  in  a
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD02135-12-1

 S. 309--A                           2
 
 manner  intended  and  designed  to  protect  the  privacy of the voter,
 INCLUDING STORING THE BALLOTS CAST IN RANDOM ORDER AND NOT  SEQUENTIALLY
 OR  CHRONOLOGICALLY  AS  CAST  BY VOTERS; such ballots [or record] shall
 allow  a  manual  audit  and  shall  be preserved in accordance with the
 provisions of section 3-222 of this chapter;
   s. permit alternative language accessibility pursuant to the  require-
 ments  of  section  203  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.
 1973aa-1a) such that it must have  the  capacity  to  display  the  full
 ballot  in  the  alternative  languages  required  by the federal Voting
 Rights Act if such voting machine or system is to  be  used  where  such
 alternative  languages  are required or where the local board deems such
 feature necessary; [and]
   t. not include any device  or  functionality  potentially  capable  of
 externally  transmitting or receiving data via the internet or via radio
 waves or via other wireless means[.];
   U. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THAT, AFTER THE  PAPER  BALLOT  IS  CAST  BY  THE
 VOTER, THE VOTING MACHINE OR SYSTEM NEVER PASSES THE CAST BALLOT UNDER A
 PRINTER  THAT  CAN PRINT VOTES ONTO THE BALLOT, INCLUDING AS A RESULT OF
 UNAUTHORIZED, MALICIOUS OR FAULTY SOFTWARE OR  FIRMWARE,  PROVIDED  THAT
 MACHINES  PURCHASED  PRIOR  TO  JUNE  FIRST, TWO THOUSAND TWENTY-ONE MAY
 CONTINUE TO BE USED;
   V. BE CONSTRUCTED SO THE CONFIGURATION OR FUNCTIONALITY  OF  A  VOTING
 MACHINE  OR SYSTEM DOES NOT INCLUDE BALLOT MARKING AND TABULATING WITHIN
 THE SAME PHYSICAL DEVICE, PROVIDED THAT MACHINES PURCHASED PRIOR TO JUNE
 FIRST, TWO THOUSAND TWENTY-ONE MAY CONTINUE TO BE USED;
   W. NOT UTILIZE, FOR THE PROCESS OF VOTE CASTING AND CANVASSING, A  BAR
 CODE,  MATRIX CODE OR ANY KIND OF RECORDING CODE THAT CANNOT BE VERIFIED
 BY THE VOTER WITHOUT USING A CODE-READING DEVICE;
   X. PERMIT THE COUNTING OF BALLOTS BY HAND OR  PERMIT  THE  READING  OF
 BALLOTS WITH AN OPTICAL CHARACTER RECOGNITION DEVICE; AND
   Y.  USE  DURABLE  PAPER BALLOTS PRINTED AND MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED
 STATES THAT ARE NOT PRINTED ON THERMAL PAPER.
   § 2. Subdivision 4 of section 7-202 of the election law, as  added  by
 chapter 181 of the laws of 2005, is amended to read as follows:
   4.  Local boards of elections which obtain voting machines pursuant to
 this chapter [may determine to] SHALL purchase [direct  recording  elec-
 tronic  machines  or]  optical  scan  machines  in  conformance with the
 requirements of this chapter.
   § 3. This act shall take effect immediately.

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The New York State Senate

senate Bill S309A

Sponsored By

Current Bill Status - Passed Senate

Your Voice

Actions

Votes

Jun 9, 2021 - floor Vote

Floor Vote: Jun 9, 2021

Jun 7, 2021 - Rules committee Vote

Rules Committee Vote: Jun 7, 2021

Bill Amendments

Co-Sponsors

S309 - Details

S309 - Summary

S309 - Sponsor Memo

S309 - Bill Text download pdf

Co-Sponsors

S309A (ACTIVE) - Details

S309A (ACTIVE) - Summary

S309A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

S309A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

Comments

senate Bill S309A

Share this bill

Sponsored By

Current Bill Status - Passed Senate

Your Voice

Actions

Votes

Jun 9, 2021 - floor Vote

Floor Vote: Jun 9, 2021

Jun 7, 2021 - Rules committee Vote

Rules Committee Vote: Jun 7, 2021

Bill Amendments

Co-Sponsors

S309 - Details

S309 - Summary

S309 - Sponsor Memo

S309 - Bill Text download pdf

Co-Sponsors

S309A (ACTIVE) - Details

S309A (ACTIVE) - Summary

S309A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

S309A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

Comments