S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                  4520

                       2015-2016 Regular Sessions

                            I N  S E N A T E

                             March 26, 2015
                               ___________

Introduced  by  Sens. CROCI, BOYLE, LAVALLE, MARCHIONE, RITCHIE, SERINO,
  SEWARD -- read twice and ordered  printed,  and  when  printed  to  be
  committed to the Committee on Codes

AN ACT to amend the penal law, in relation to murder in the first degree

  THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section 1. Section 125.27 of the penal law, as added by chapter 367 of
the laws of 1974, subdivision 1 as amended by chapter 1 of the  laws  of
1995,  subparagraph (ii-a) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by
chapter 1 of the laws of 2013, subparagraph (vii) of  paragraph  (a)  of
subdivision  1  as  amended by chapter 264 of the laws of 2003, subpara-
graph (xii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as  amended  and  subpara-
graph  (xiii)  of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by chapter 300
of the laws of 2001, is amended to read as follows:
S 125.27 Murder in the first degree.
  A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
  1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he OR SHE  causes
the death of such person or of a third person; and
  (a) Either:
  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
[34]  THIRTY-FOUR  of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was
at the time of the killing engaged in the course of  performing  his  OR
HER  official  duties,  and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the intended victim was a police officer; or
  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision  twenty-one,  subdivision  twenty-three,  twenty-four  or
sixty-two  (employees  of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his OR HER official duties, and the defendant  knew
or  reasonably  should  have  known  that the intended victim was such a

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD10013-01-5

              

S. 4520                             2

uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or  employee
of the division for youth; or
  (ii-a)  the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical tech-
nician, ambulance  driver,  paramedic,  physician  or  registered  nurse
involved  in  a first response team, or any other individual who, in the
course of official duties, performs emergency  response  activities  and
was  engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim  was  such
firefighter,  emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,
physician or registered nurse; or
  (iii) the intended victim was an  employee  of  a  state  correctional
institution  or  was  an  employee  of  a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction  law,  who
was  at  the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
OR HER official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the intended victim was an employee of a  state  correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; or
  (iv)  at  the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was
confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody
upon a sentence for the term of his OR  HER  natural  life,  or  upon  a
sentence  commuted  to  one  of  natural life, or upon a sentence for an
indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen  years  and
the  maximum of which was natural life, or at the time of the commission
of the killing, the defendant  had  escaped  from  such  confinement  or
custody  while  serving such a sentence and had not yet been returned to
such confinement or custody; or
  (v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a  prior
occasion  and  the  death  was  caused for the purpose of preventing the
intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether
or not such action or proceeding had been  commenced,  or  the  intended
victim  had  previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and
the killing was committed for the purpose of  exacting  retribution  for
such  prior  testimony,  or  the intended victim was an immediate family
member of a witness to a crime committed on a  prior  occasion  and  the
killing  was  committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the
testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate fami-
ly member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action
or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of  exacting
retribution  upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in this
subparagraph "immediate family member" means a  husband,  wife,  father,
mother,  daughter,  son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, step-
child or grandchild; or
  (vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the
killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than  the  intended
victim  to  commit  the  same  for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or
from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction  of
a party to such agreement; or
  (vii)  the  victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of
committing or attempting  to  commit  and  in  furtherance  of  robbery,
burglary  in  the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first
degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape  in  the  first
degree,  criminal  sexual  act  in the first degree, sexual abuse in the
first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or  escape  in
the  first  degree,  or  in  the  course of and furtherance of immediate
flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the

S. 4520                             3

course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit
the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however,  the  victim
is  not  a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided
further  that,  unless  the  defendant's  criminal  liability under this
subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person
to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to  section
20.00  of  this  chapter,  this  subparagraph  shall not apply where the
defendant's criminal liability is based  upon  the  conduct  of  another
pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or
  (viii)  as  part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with
intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional
person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or  persons;
provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal tran-
saction; or
  (ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted
of  murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,
or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an  offense  which,  if
committed  in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such
sections; or
  (x) the defendant acted in  an  especially  cruel  and  wanton  manner
pursuant  to  a  course  of  conduct  intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death.  As  used  in  this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme  physical  pain;  "depraved"  means  the  defendant relished the
infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim  evidencing  debase-
ment  or  perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure
in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
  (xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more addi-
tional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within
a period of twenty-four months when committed in a  similar  fashion  or
pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
  (xii)  the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision twen-
ty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the defendant
killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the  killing,
a judge; or
  (xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as
defined  in  paragraph  (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this
chapter; [and] OR
  (XIV) THE INTENDED VICTIM WAS A MEMBER OF THE NEW YORK  GUARD  OR  THE
NEW YORK NAVAL MILITIA WHO WAS AT THE TIME OF THE KILLING ENGAGED IN THE
COURSE  OF PERFORMING HIS OR HER OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND THE DEFENDANT KNEW
OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE INTENDED VICTIM WAS A MEMBER OF
THE NEW YORK GUARD OR THE NEW YORK NAVAL MILITIA; AND
  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of  the
commission of the crime.
  2.  In  any  prosecution  under  subdivision one, it is an affirmative
defense that:
  (a) The defendant acted  under  the  influence  of  extreme  emotional
disturbance  for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined  from  the  viewpoint  of  a
person  in  the  defendant's  situation  under  the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction  of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the
second degree; or

S. 4520                             4

  (b)  The  defendant's  conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.  Noth-
ing  contained  in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prose-
cution for, or preclude a conviction  of,  manslaughter  in  the  second
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
  Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
  S 2. This act shall take effect immediately.

                            
                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                 4520--A
    Cal. No. 141

                       2015-2016 Regular Sessions

                            I N  S E N A T E

                             March 26, 2015
                               ___________

Introduced  by Sens. CROCI, BOYLE, DeFRANCISCO, FUNKE, GALLIVAN, GOLDEN,
  LAVALLE, MARCHIONE, NOZZOLIO, RANZENHOFER, RITCHIE, SERINO, SEWARD  --
  read  twice  and  ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to
  the Committee on Codes -- recommitted to the  Committee  on  Codes  in
  accordance  with Senate Rule 6, sec. 8 -- reported favorably from said
  committee, ordered to first and second  report,  ordered  to  a  third
  reading,  amended  and  ordered  reprinted, retaining its place in the
  order of third reading

AN ACT to amend the penal law, in relation to murder in the first degree

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section  1.  Section 10.00 of the penal law is amended by adding a new
subdivision 22 to read as follows:
  22. "MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR RESERVES" MEANS (A)  A  MEMBER  OF  THE
UNITED STATES ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINES, COAST GUARD, ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD, AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND/OR RESERVES THEREOF OR (B) A MEMBER OF THE
NEW YORK GUARD OR THE NEW YORK NAVAL MILITIA.
  S  2.  Section 125.27 of the penal law, as added by chapter 367 of the
laws of 1974, subdivision 1 as amended by chapter 1 of the laws of 1995,
subparagraph (ii-a) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by  chap-
ter 1 of the laws of 2013, subparagraph (vii) of paragraph (a) of subdi-
vision  1  as  amended  by chapter 264 of the laws of 2003, subparagraph
(xii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision  1  as  amended  and  subparagraph
(xiii)  of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by chapter 300 of the
laws of 2001, is amended to read as follows:
S 125.27 Murder in the first degree.
  A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
  1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he OR SHE  causes
the death of such person or of a third person; and
  (a) Either:

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD10013-02-6
              

S. 4520--A                          2

  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
[34]  THIRTY-FOUR  of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was
at the time of the killing engaged in the course of  performing  his  OR
HER  official  duties,  and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the intended victim was a police officer; or
  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of  subdivision  twenty-one,  subdivision  twenty-three,  twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10  of  the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course  of performing his OR HER official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the  intended  victim  was  such  a
uniformed  court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee
of the division for youth; or
  (ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical  tech-
nician,  ambulance  driver,  paramedic,  physician  or  registered nurse
involved in a first response team, or any other individual who,  in  the
course  of  official  duties, performs emergency response activities and
was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the  defendant
knew  or  reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such
firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver,  paramedic,
physician or registered nurse; or
  (iii)  the  intended  victim  was  an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee  of  a  local  correctional  facility  as
defined  in  subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of  performing  his
OR HER official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known  that  the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; or
  (iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the  defendant  was
confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody
upon  a  sentence  for  the  term  of his OR HER natural life, or upon a
sentence commuted to one of natural life, or  upon  a  sentence  for  an
indeterminate  term  the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and
the maximum of which was natural life, or at the time of the  commission
of  the  killing,  the  defendant  had  escaped from such confinement or
custody while serving such a sentence and had not yet been  returned  to
such confinement or custody; or
  (v)  the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior
occasion and the death was caused for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the
intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether
or  not  such  action  or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended
victim had previously testified in a criminal action or  proceeding  and
the  killing  was  committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for
such prior testimony, or the intended victim  was  an  immediate  family
member  of  a  witness  to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the
killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or  influencing  the
testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate fami-
ly member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action
or  proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting
retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in  this
subparagraph  "immediate  family  member" means a husband, wife, father,
mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent,  grandparent,  step-
child or grandchild; or
  (vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the
killing  pursuant  to an agreement with a person other than the intended
victim to commit the same for the receipt,  or  in  expectation  of  the

S. 4520--A                          3

receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or
from  a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of
a party to such agreement; or
  (vii)  the  victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of
committing or attempting  to  commit  and  in  furtherance  of  robbery,
burglary  in  the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first
degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape  in  the  first
degree,  criminal  sexual  act  in the first degree, sexual abuse in the
first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or  escape  in
the  first  degree,  or  in  the  course of and furtherance of immediate
flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the
course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit
the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however,  the  victim
is  not  a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided
further that, unless  the  defendant's  criminal  liability  under  this
subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person
to  cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section
20.00 of this chapter, this  subparagraph  shall  not  apply  where  the
defendant's  criminal  liability  is  based  upon the conduct of another
pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or
  (viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the  defendant,  with
intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional
person  or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;
provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal tran-
saction; or
  (ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted
of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this  article,
or  had  been  convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if
committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of  such
sections; or
  (x)  the  defendant  acted  in  an  especially cruel and wanton manner
pursuant to a course of  conduct  intended  to  inflict  and  inflicting
torture  upon  the  victim  prior to the victim's death. As used in this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme physical pain;  "depraved"  means  the  defendant  relished  the
infliction  of  extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debase-
ment or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense  of  pleasure
in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
  (xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more addi-
tional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within
a  period  of  twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or
pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
  (xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision  twen-
ty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the defendant
killed  such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing,
a judge; or
  (xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as
defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section  490.05  of  this
chapter; [and] OR
  (XIV) THE INTENDED VICTIM WAS A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR RESERVES WHO
WAS  AT  THE TIME OF THE KILLING ENGAGED IN THE COURSE OF PERFORMING HIS
OR HER OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN THAT THE INTENDED VICTIM WAS A MEMBER OF THE NEW YORK GUARD OR THE
NEW YORK NAVAL MILITIA; AND
  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of  the
commission of the crime.

S. 4520--A                          4

  2.  In  any  prosecution  under  subdivision one, it is an affirmative
defense that:
  (a)  The  defendant  acted  under  the  influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,  the
reasonableness  of  which  is  to  be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's  situation  under  the  circumstances  as  the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute  a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the
second degree; or
  (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing  or  aiding,  without
the  use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Noth-
ing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to  a  prose-
cution  for,  or  preclude  a  conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
  Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
  S 3. This act shall take effect immediately.