NY State Senate Bill 2019-S1738

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

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- In Committee Assembly
- In Committee Senate
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Delivered to Governor
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	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
Jan 08, 2020	referred to codes
Jan 16, 2019	referred to codes

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2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Details

Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in 2017-2018 Legislative Session:: S7006

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

                                
 
BILL NUMBER: S1738

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a. reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,

after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June

6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
case length from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than 70
percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guidelines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating so. At the very next court date, the People can
declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.  Yet, even
though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the prosecution
is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested.  As a 2014 New
Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood before a
judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and got six
weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-month dead-
line."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2017-18: S7006B - Amended and Recommitted to Codes

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

                            
 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                   1738
 
                        2019-2020 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                             January 16, 2019
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by Sens. BAILEY, ADDABBO, BIAGGI, BRESLIN, CARLUCCI, COMRIE,
   KAVANAGH, KRUEGER, MONTGOMERY, RIVERA -- read twice and ordered print-
   ed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Codes
 
 AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
   for a speedy trial

   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
   § 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
 184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
 chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
 amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
 4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
 vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
 subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
 of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
 (b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
 paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
 laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
 § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
   1.  Except  as  otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
 pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or  para-
 graph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where the
 people are not ready for trial within:
   (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 felony;
   (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
 months and none of which is a felony;

  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.

                                                            LBD05618-01-9

 S. 1738                             2
 
   (c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal  action  wherein  the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor  punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
 three months and none of which is a crime punishable by  a  sentence  of
 imprisonment of more than three months; OR
   (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 violation and none of which is a crime.
   (E) FOR THE PURPOSES OF  THIS  SUBDIVISION,  THE  TERM  OFFENSE  SHALL
 INCLUDE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTIONS.
   2. Except as provided in subdivision three, where a defendant has been
 committed  to  the  custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND
 FAMILY SERVICES in a criminal action he OR SHE must be released on  bail
 or  on  his OR HER own recognizance, upon such conditions as may be just
 and reasonable, if the people are not ready for trial in  that  criminal
 action within:
   (a)  ninety days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES  in
 a  criminal  action  wherein  the  defendant  is  accused of one or more
 offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
   (b) thirty days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to  the
 custody  of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in
 a criminal action wherein the  defendant  is  accused  of  one  or  more
 offenses,  at  least  one  of  which  is  a  misdemeanor punishable by a
 sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which  is
 a felony;
   (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody  of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in
 a criminal action wherein the  defendant  is  accused  of  one  or  more
 offenses,  at  least  one  of  which  is  a  misdemeanor punishable by a
 sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none of which
 is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more  than  three
 months; OR
   (d)  five  days  from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES  in
 a  criminal  action  wherein  the  defendant  is  accused of one or more
 offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of  which  is  a
 crime.
   (E)  FOR  THE  PURPOSES  OF  THIS  SUBDIVISION, THE TERM OFFENSE SHALL
 INCLUDE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTIONS.
   3. (a) Subdivisions one and two do not  apply  to  a  criminal  action
 wherein  the  defendant  is  accused  of  an offense defined in sections
 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
   (b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon  expiration
 of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
 trial  if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of the
 specified period and their present unreadiness is  due  to  some  excep-
 tional  fact  or circumstance, including, but not limited to, the sudden
 unavailability of evidence material  to  the  people's  case,  when  the
 district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
 and there are reasonable grounds to  believe  that  such  evidence  will
 become available in a reasonable period.
   (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
   (i)  apply  to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
 another offense;

 S. 1738                             3
 
   (ii) require the release from custody of any  defendant  who  is  also
 being  held  in  custody  pending trial of another criminal charge as to
 which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
   (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
 who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
 otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
 which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
 ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
   4.  In  computing  the  time within which the people must be ready for
 trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following  periods  must
 be excluded:
   (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
 concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
 the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
 incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
 particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
 period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
 or
   (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
 court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
 HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
 satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
 account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
 charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
 consented  to  a  continuance  unless  he OR SHE has been advised by the
 court of his OR HER rights under these  rules  and  the  effect  of  his
 consent, WHICH MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
   (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
 ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
 location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
 cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
 ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
 his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
   (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
 to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
 on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
 another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
 bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
 failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
 subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
 tarily or otherwise; or
   (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
 trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
 section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
 ance; or
   (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
 another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
 detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
 obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
   (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
 no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
 own attorney with the permission of the court; or
   (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
 including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
 continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
 continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-

 S. 1738                             4
 
 al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
 diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
 believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
 or  (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney addi-
 tional time to prepare the people's case and additional time  is  justi-
 fied  by  the exceptional circumstances of the case.  ANY SUCH EXCLUSION
 WHEN A STATEMENT OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A  STATEMENT  OF  READINESS
 MADE  BY  THE PEOPLE MUST BE EVALUATED BY THE COURT AFTER INQUIRY ON THE
 RECORD AS TO THE REASONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS AND SHALL ONLY  BE
 APPROVED UPON A SHOWING OF SUFFICIENT SUPPORTING FACTS; OR
   (h)  the  period  during which an action has been adjourned in contem-
 plation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and  215.10  of
 this chapter[.]; OR
   (i)  [The]  THE  period prior to the defendant's actual appearance for
 arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been  directed  to
 appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
 120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
   (j)  the period during which a family offense is before a family court
 until such time as an  accusatory  instrument  or  indictment  is  filed
 against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
 such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
   5.  WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR OTHERWISE
 PROVIDES NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR  TRIAL,  THE  COURT  SHALL
 MAKE  INQUIRY  ON  THE  RECORD  AS  TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER
 CONDUCTING ITS INQUIRY, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT  THE  PEOPLE  ARE  NOT
 READY TO PROCEED TO TRIAL, THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READ-
 INESS  SHALL  NOT  BE  VALID  FOR  PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A
 DEMAND TO PRODUCE BY A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO SECTION 240.20, ANY  STATE-
 MENT  OF  TRIAL  READINESS  MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY A CERTIF-
 ICATION OF GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH  THE  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
 SECTION  240.20  AND  THE DEFENSE SHALL BE AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE
 HEARD ON THE RECORD AS TO WHETHER THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS HAVE  BEEN
 MET.  THIS  SUBDIVISION  SHALL  NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE DEFENSE HAS
 WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
   5-A. UPON A LOCAL CRIMINAL COURT ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT, A STATEMENT OF
 READINESS SHALL NOT BE VALID UNLESS ALL COUNTS CHARGED IN THE ACCUSATORY
 INSTRUMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUBDIVISIONS ONE, TWO  OR  THREE  OF
 SECTION  100.40 OF THIS CHAPTER AND THE PROSECUTION MOVES TO DISMISS ANY
 COUNTS NOT MEETING SUCH.
   6. IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE  MUST  BE  READY  FOR
 TRIAL,  PURSUANT  TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO PERIOD OF DELAY
 RESULTING FROM COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
   7. IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE  MUST  BE  READY  FOR
 TRIAL,  PURSUANT  TO  PARAGRAPHS  (B), (C) AND (D) OF SUBDIVISION ONE OF
 THIS SECTION, NO PERIOD OF DELAY RESULTING FROM COURT  CONGESTION  SHALL
 BE EXCLUDED.
   [5.] 8. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
 tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
 following  a  mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or collat-
 eral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to  the  custody  of
 the  sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, if any, must
 be deemed to have commenced on the date the withdrawal of  the  plea  of
 guilty or the date the order occasioning a retrial becomes final;
   (b)  where  a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
 criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
 ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;

 S. 1738                             5
 
   (c) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
 complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
 article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
 pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
 subdivision  one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of  the  filing  of  the
 felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instru-
 ment  exceeds  six  months,  the period applicable to the charges in the
 felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accu-
 satory instrument had not been filed;
   (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
 complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
 article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
 pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
 subdivision  two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of  the  filing  of  the
 felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instru-
 ment  exceeds  ninety  days, the period applicable to the charges in the
 felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accu-
 satory instrument had not been filed.
   (e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
 meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
 information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
 210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision one of
 this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  four  of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
 filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
 the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusa-
 tory instrument had not been filed;
   (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  two  of
 this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date  of  the
 filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument  exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
 the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusa-
 tory instrument had not been filed.

 S. 1738                             6
 
   [6.] 9. The procedural rules prescribed in  subdivisions  one  through
 seven  of  section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indict-
 ment are [also] NOT applicable to a motion made pursuant to  subdivision
 two.    IF,  UPON  ORAL ARGUMENT, A TIME PERIOD IS IN DISPUTE, THE COURT
 MUST  PROMPTLY CONDUCT A HEARING IN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THAT THE
 TIME PERIOD IS EXCLUDABLE.
   § 3. Section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law is amended by adding
 a new subdivision 6-a to read as follows:
   6-A. AN ORDER FINALLY DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO SUBDIVI-
 SION ONE OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE REVIEWABLE  UPON  AN  APPEAL  FROM  AN
 ENSUING  JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH JUDG-
 MENT IS ENTERED UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY.
   § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
 have become a law.

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Senate Bill S1738

Sponsored By

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

co-Sponsors

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Details

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Summary

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

Comments

Senate Bill S1738

Share this bill

Sponsored By

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

co-Sponsors

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Details

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Summary

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

2019-S1738 (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

Comments